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Abstract 
 
The $6 billion trading loss at JPMorgan Chase — due to the over-sized trading 
positions taken by the bank’s London trader, colorfully called the London Whale — 
induced Senate inquiries and hearings earlier this year, embarrassing the bank and its 
otherwise respected chief, Jamie Dimon. Severe critics saw the bank’s massive loss as 
showing that banks still do not have their house in order after the 2007–2009 financial 
crisis, but most viewed the trading debacle as cautionary, not one fundamentally 
implicating regulatory policy. After all, the losses were only a fraction of JPMorgan’s $20 
billion annual earnings. The setback was one for the bank’s shareholders and managers 
and, hence, one for ordinary corporate governance. Hence, the standard view is that the 
loss was no major public policy problem, as public funds were never really at risk. 
This set-up induces us to analyze the corporate governance of the too-big-to-fail 
American financial firm — analysis that has not yet been systematically done. For 
industrial conglomerates that have grown too large, internal and external corporate 
structural pressures arise to re-size the firm. External activists press the firm to 
restructure to raise its stock market value. Inside the firm, boards and managers see that 
the too-big firm can be more efficient and more profitable overall if restructured via spin-
offs and sales. But for large, too-big-to-fail financial firms (1) if the value captured by 
being too-big-to-fail lowers the firms’ financing costs enough and (2) if a resized firm 
after spin-offs and break-ups would lose that funding benefit , then a major constraint on 
industrial firm over-expansion breaks down for too-big-to-fail finance.  
I argue in this paper that both propositions (1) and (2) have been true and, 
consequently, a major retardant to industrial firm over-expansion has been missing in the 
large financial firm. Debt cost savings — the implicit subsidy — in the too-big-to-fail 
financial sector have a magnitude amounting to a good fraction of the big firms’ profits. 
Directors contemplating corporate simplification and spin-offs at a too-big-to-fail 
financial firm face the problem that the spun-off, smaller firms would lose access to 
cheaper too-big-to-fail funding. Hence, they will be reluctant to push for break-up, for 
spin-offs and for slowing down firm expansion. They would get a better managed group of 
financial firms if their restructuring succeeded, but they would lose the too-big-to-fail 
subsidy embedded in the lowered funding costs. Subtly and pervasively, the internal 
corporate counterpressures that resist excessive bulk, size, and growth are absent. 
This problem of corporate degradation due to too-big-to-fail finance burdens the 
economy. In addition to the well-known cost of bailouts, too big-to-fail finance induces a 
hidden but pervasive degradation of financial firm efficiency from the best possible. The 
analytic here also has policy implications beyond just reducing too-big-to-fail risks. Most 
post-crisis financial regulation has been command-and-control rules on capital and 
activities. The corporate governance analytic points us to incentives as unused policy 
tools. Incentives toward corrective corporate measures degrade, so policymakers could 
seek to reverse that degradation. By mimicking an effective market with mechanisms 
offsetting the too-big-to-fail subsidy and, subtly but with long-run staying power, by 
reproducing the incentives of private parties to make more efficacious market choices, 
policymakers could harness incentives that too-big-to-fail finance degrades and often 
destroys in large financial firms. Lastly, the corporate degradation analytic has on-the-
ground corporate dealmaking implications: if the command-and-control regulation 
succeeds, it should lead to sharp corporate restructurings in financial firms. I outline the 
mechanisms and implications. Structural Corporate Degradation Due to Too-Big-to-Fail Finance 
Mark J. Roe 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate governance controls help to keep firms competitive and efficient. 
They work imperfectly and at times do not work at all, but overall they push large 
firms to do better. Persistently poor results induce a firm’s board to assess the results 
and the firm’s internal organization to see if it needs restructuring. Shareholders often 
agitate for change, corporate funding costs rise and limit managers from continuing 
down an unprofitable path, and, at the limit, corporate activists such as hedge funds 
agitate for the firm to be broken up into separate, more tightly organized parts. 
But these corporate controls deteriorate in large too-big-to-fail financial firms. 
The most powerful corporate governance control in recent decades has been the 
corporate takeover and break-up of a too-large industrial firm into its constituent parts, 
inducing the restructuring of American industrial conglomerates in the 1980s. If 
financial firms were today subject to such pressure, then firms that became too big 
would face shareholder efforts for break-up, some of which would succeed. I here first 
analyze the interaction between financial corporate structure and the break-up takeover 
— the strongest corporate governance tool, despite its ongoing rarity — as a metric, to 
see that the strongest tool cannot come out of the corporate governance toolbox, but 
must remain locked up, unused. The strongest corporate governance controls, as well 
as most day-to-day corporate pressures and controls for boards to re-size, spin off, and 
restructure, cannot work well, or at all, in the too-big-to-fail financial firm.  
The explanation — that too-big-to-fail finance is restructuring-proof — is not 
yet integral to the analytics of the too-big-to-fail problem. Its core explanation is as 
follows. The likelihood that big finance will be bailed out in a crisis lowers the 
financial firms’ cost of funding. These lower financing costs redound to the benefit of 
the firms’ shareholders. This much is commonplace. But the implicit too-big-to-fail 
subsidy is also a shadow poison pill — the governance defense that managers and 
boards have used successfully for the past quarter-century to ward off unwanted 
takeovers in the industrial sector, by diluting the offeror’s stock but not others, thereby 
deterring it from offering to buy the target company. And the implicit pill here is a 
powerful one, as it builds a strong, conceivably insurmountable barrier to restructuring 
even a weak and partially broken financial firm that is operating at an inefficient, 
excessively bulky scale. Worse for corporate governance pressure, it is even stronger 
in impeding restructuring than a conventional poison pill: The conventional pill 
impedes outsiders, not insiders. But the too-big-to-fail “pill” also impedes insiders — a 
controlling shareholder where there is one, the board of directors, and the CEO — 
from restructuring the firm, even if such a restructuring would be operationally wise. 
An operationally-successful restructuring of such a too-big-to-fail financial firm 
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will increase the firm’s (or its spun-off divisions’) overall value to the economy, but it 
will  decrease the private value of the firm’s stock to the extent the restructuring 
strengthens the constituent firms enough, or makes them small enough, such that they 
either are no longer too-big-to-fail or are made unlikely-to-fail. If the constituent parts 
would no longer be too big, then, as long as the expected value of the subsidy lost 
exceeds that of the restructuring gains, stockholders lack the incentive to restructure 
the firm and have plenty of reason to oppose even an operationally efficient one that 
outsiders seek. Corporate governance at the too-big-to-fail financial firm degrades. 
This corporate degradation hurts not only the firm but the economy as a whole.  
Just as a monopolist will invest to protect its monopoly benefits up to the private profit 
the monopoly gives it, a too-big-to-fail firm will sacrifice its own efficiency, and the 
financial system’s, up to the cost of its subsidy advantage. It need not even be aware 
that the profitability of a line of business depends on the too-big-to-fail boost. The full 
size of the too-big-to-fail subsidy — typically estimated in the tens of billions of 
dollars annually — can be lost to the economy. The too-big-to-fail subsidy allows the 
firm to take on activities that could be handled more efficiently elsewhere in the 
economy. Worse, it provides incentives for weak finance that can degrade not just the 
firm, but the overall economy. 
* * *  
The roadmap for the article: In Part I, I describe the recent controversy over 
JPMorgan Chase’s London Whale and the bank’s $6 billion trading loss, which 
embarrassed the firm, derailed previously-successful executives’ careers, and led to 
congressional investigations and much media attention. The managerial lapse induced 
two contrasting classes of responses: One sought more regulation because even 
America’s best-reputed big bank could make a major mistake. The second dismissed 
the problem as, yes, a huge loss, but one well within both JPMorgan Chase’s $20 
billion in annual earnings and its $200 billion of bank capital, and, hence, the Whale 
problem was primarily one for shareholders and managers — a tempest in a teapot, as 
the bank’s CEO called it. Related to the tempest-in-a-teapot response, respected 
commentators argue that although big finance has become too large to be efficient, 
market forces will over time induce the too-big financial firms to get themselves right-
sized. Although those market processes work crudely and incompletely, the market’s 
incentives will — as it’s becoming conventionally thought, but disputed in this article 
— necessarily push financial firms in the right direction. 
 In Part II, I analyze the conceptual impact of the too-big-to-fail subsidy on 
financial firms’ cost-of-funding, which operates as a powerful corporate poison pill. It 
destroys takeover value for a shareholder who would buy up the firm’s stock and break 
up a far-too-big banking conglomerate. Less dramatically, but more importantly, the 
potential loss of the too-big-to-fail subsidy also reduces the value to shareholders and 
the organization itself of other day-to-day corporate restructuring strategies that 
managers and boards at the firm might otherwise pursue. Managers at an orphaned 
subsidiary might, for example, seek financing to buy those operations out from the 
financial conglomerate, believing they can run the spun-off operation better than the 
far-off senior managers at the bank’s headquarters. But the buyout’s funding would not 
garner the too-big-to-fail subsidy that the entire financial firm gets. Hence, the Degradation Due to Too-Big-to-Fail Finance 
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divisional managers and their financial backers face higher financing costs and cannot 
buy out a division even if the buyout would otherwise be profitable and operationally 
wise. The too-big-to-fail “pill” degrades both internal and external incentives to build 
better, stronger corporate structures. Importantly, the firm’s senior managers need not 
seek the too-big-to-fail subsidy, and may even deny to themselves its existence, and it 
will still drive their fundamental structural decisions. 
In Part III, we turn to the empirical side, examining the too-big-to-fail data. We 
reconfigure the extant data, which measures what the too-big firm saves on its 
borrowings due to lowered funding costs, into a percentage of shareholder profits. That 
reconfiguring shows average estimates of the financial crisis leading to the too-big-to-
fail subsidy increasing by about one-third of these financial firms’ profits. We also 
examine weaknesses and instabilities in the data: the largest too-big-to-fail firms are 
even larger now than they were before the 2007–2009 financial crisis, the rating 
agencies have been showing a widening gap between the banks’ standalone quality and 
their creditworthiness with government backing, and the overall picture is of a subsidy 
amounting to the size of the takeover premium needed to motivate a takeover. If these 
levels persist, not only is no takeover economically possible, but, more importantly, 
operationally efficient internal restructurings to downsize or spin off will often not 
make economic sense to the firm, its managers, and its shareholders. 
In Part IV, we examine related economic concepts, emanating from antitrust 
analysis of the costs of monopoly. Applying that thinking to financial firms shows how 
the extended costs of too-big-to-fail reach into organizational integrity and efficiency 
of the affected firms in ways that can even exceed the size of the subsidy itself.  
In Part V, we examine other, parallel degradation due to too-big-to-fail status, 
including excessive leverage, regulatory degradation, inability (not just unwillingness) 
to raise new capital, and other social costs. While these risk-based regulatory problems 
arising from too-big-to-fail finance have been well-examined, the corporate 
governance problems of boards, break-ups, spin-offs, and the like have not been.  
Then in Part VI, we examine the public policy implications, opportunities, and 
difficulties, focusing on incentive effects and fixes. The ongoing policy efforts fall into 
two main categories: command-and-control instructions to increase financial firm 
capital and to limit their riskiest activities; and construction of stronger failure 
mechanisms, so as to make failure an option for big financial firms. Each category — 
command-and-control and making failure an option — could, in theory, solve the too-
big-to-fail problem. The measures move us closer to the public interest but, critics 
think, do not yet in practice solve the too-big-to-fail problem. The corporate 
governance incentive analytics here suggest a further foray that has been largely absent 
from the policy discussion: policymakers can also seek to alter the internal incentives 
of the shareholders, boards, and managers to better match the public’s, primarily by 
making risky debt more expensive for the financial firm. I outline how this could be 
achieved. The finance world could be improved by using all three categories of policy 
tools. As of now only two categories are being used. 
In Part VII, we consider what big finance would look like without the too-big-
to-fail subsidy. Firms with shareholder-centered corporate governance did worse in the 
financial crisis than firms with weak shareholder orientation, and the analytics here Degradation Due to Too-Big-to-Fail Finance 
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show why that was so and why, without the subsidy, they should have done better. The 
policy implication of the degradation conceptualized here is not to further unleash 
shareholders with today’s distorted incentives inside big finance but instead to reduce 
the distortions to better align their incentives with the public’s.  
And, then we examine the dealmaking impact if the too-big firms’ funding costs 
come to reflect their operations, without the subsidy. Normal corporate processes 
would press to restructure and down-size the biggest and least efficient. Ending the 
subsidy, or even cutting back the big increase from the financial crisis, should unleash 
the usual market mechanisms that facilitate right-sizing of corporations. Board and 
managerial incentives would better match public goals. If successful regulation slashes 
a large too-big-to-fail subsidy, then big finance should restructure, sua sponte.  
The results could include dramatically forcing a restructuring, but much of the 
corporate governance effort would over time be internal: new ventures would need a 
higher hurdle rate to be justified, while some major old ventures would become 
uncompetitive and then be shifted out and sold. This latter process would not be a 
dramatic, near-instant restructuring, but a steady, multi-year evolutionary 
reconstruction of the biggest financial firms that would make the American financial 
system safer, stronger, and better for the American economy. 
 
I. THE LONDON WHALE AND JPMORGAN’S $6 BILLION TRADING LOSS 
 
A. The Events and the Corporate Governance Failure 
 
The London Whale debacle is now well known in financial circles. JPMorgan 
Chase, America’s largest bank, is reputed to be our best-managed bank, with the 
widely-respected Jamie Dimon as its chief executive officer. Yet, despite its 
reputation, mismanaged trades lost the bank $6 billion. (In financial trading markets, as 
in professional poker, a “whale” is a poor player with a thick wallet.) 
The story begins when the economy improved after the 2007–2009 financial 
crisis, as JPMorgan concluded it was prudent to reduce its exposure to credit 
derivatives. Because of illiquidity in that market, the JPMorgan traders decided not to 
sell the positions they had already taken, but instead to buy new, opposite positions, 
although with different maturities.
1 A JPMorgan trader based in London — the Whale 
— made many of these trades. However, as credit markets rallied in early 2012, the 
original positions lost even more value, without the new positions’ profits making up 
for the continuing losses. Worse, the larger portfolio became too big, too complex, and 
too unwieldy to manage well. JPM owned too much of this market and when 
management finally decided to unwind the trades (by selling many off), it found that 
there were no longer enough buyers, as JPM itself had been the primary buyer in many 
of the underlying markets. The assets could not be sold at good prices.
2 
                                                           
1 Testimony of Ina R. Drew, Former Head of the Chief Investment Office, J.P Morgan Chase & 
Co., before the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, at 4 (Mar. 15, 2013). 
2 U.S. Sen. Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, JPMorgan Chase Whale Trades: A Case 
History of Derivatives Risks and Abuses [“Senate Whale Trade Investigation”], at 90 (Bipartisan Staff 
Report, Mar. 15, 2013); Gregory Zuckerman & Katy Burne, London Whale Rattles Debt Market, WALL ST. Degradation Due to Too-Big-to-Fail Finance 
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JPM’s first public accounting pegged the loss at $2 billion, about one-tenth of 
the bank’s annual profit. Questions immediately arose as to the quality of JPM’s risk 
management team — previously reputed to be stellar — since they had allowed the 
bank to be cornered with such a large position. If JPM could not handle these risks 
well, how would less well-managed banks fare? As the story unfolded, JPM’s losses 
mounted. By the time the bank had closed out its position, it had lost $6 billion. 
Congress and the media excoriated Dimon and JPM’s senior management for 
failing to control the original trades, for failing to wind them down at lower loss levels, 
for being uninformed about the full extent of JPM’s vulnerability on the trades, and for 
misleading the public and the regulators about the trades’ size and embedded loss.
3 
 
B. The Corporate Governance Conventional Wisdom 
 
Senior management stumbled badly at JPM. The anti-bank critique is that the 
lapse shows that banks are still taking too many risks for the public good. So, the 
Senate hearings on the Whale and the loss had senators urging that the Whale debacle 
justified moving trading out from banks, for fear that future losses could be larger — 
so large that they could lead to a bailout. As is well known now, big financial firm 
managers have reason to accept otherwise too-large risks in too-big-to-fail financial 
firms: If the risk pays off, shareholders gain and managers’ get big bonuses. On the 
other hand, if the risk turns out badly, then shareholders and other financiers of the 
firm are unhappy at first (and remain unhappy in the firm that is not too-big-to-fail), 
but the government will bail out many of them, making the downside not as unpleasant 
as for a typical industrial firm, which would have to file for bankruptcy. 
But this risk-taking view has been met by a powerful hands-off rebuttal, that the 
shareholders bore the brunt of the loss, not the public. 
1. A Loss Well Within Shareholders’ Equity. Compare the size of the Whale’s 
trading loss to JPM’s size. The loss, albeit tremendous, amounted to less than one-third 
of JPM’s 2012 profits and only 3% of JPM’s $200 billion of capital.
4 It was well 
within shareholders’ equity and, hence, the bank’s defenders assert, is a shareholder 
problem, not a public problem. “Why should the public be worried,” JPM supporters 
asked, “about the loss in a year of otherwise extraordinary profit for the bank?”
5 
                                                                                                                                                   
J., Apr. 9, 2012, at 1; Katy Burne, Making Waves Against the “Whale,” WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 2012, at C1 
(“J.P. Morgan sold so much of the index swaps ... that the cost of default protection on the basket of 
companies fell sharply....  [After JPM stopped trading, t]he cost of CDS on the index rose....”). 
3 Senate Whale Trade Investigation, supra note 2, at 10; Editorial, Lessons from the London Whale, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2013; Editorial, Jamie Dimon Loses Big, Chicago Tribune, May12, 2012, at 10. 
4 JPMorgan Chase & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 62 (Feb. 28, 2013). 
5 William Jaenike, JPMorgan’s Trading Loss, N.Y. TIMES, Mar 23, 2013, at BU5. JPM’s former 
CEO, William B. Harrison said: “It was disappointing to all of us that we had that kind of loss, but the 
important thing is to put it into perspective, which the market didn’t do very well. A lot of people 
overreacted to it.” Dawn Kopecki, Harrison Says Public Overreacted to JPMorgan’s CIO Trading Loss, 
BLOOMBERG, Sept. 5, 2012, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-05/harrison-says-
public-overreacted-to-jpmorgan-s-cio-trading-loss.htm. Or, consider a financial analyst’s view: “The 
holding company made $29.9 billion in operating income and just over $20 billion in net income for 
2011…. [T]he reported losses, in and of themselves, are not likely to have a dramatic impact on J.P. 
Morgan’s long-term financial stability.” Gene Kirsch, Senior Banking Analyst, J.P.Morgan Chase: Putting Degradation Due to Too-Big-to-Fail Finance 
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2. Shareholder and Board-Based Governance Will Remedy. Serious losses can 
activate shareholder-based corporate governance in industrial firms. Shareholders 
agitate for boardroom change, boards often replace senior managers, and, in extreme 
cases, shareholders force the break-up of a too-big-to-manage firm into its constituent 
business lines. Although such efforts often fail, enough do succeed to make industrial 
firms more effective than they otherwise would be.  
A big industrial firm that is far above its optimal size should attract such 
attention. Perhaps the same could become a reality for too-big financial firms. Indeed, 
Henry Kaufmann, long one of Wall Street’s leading financial analysts, recently 
announced that the large American financial conglomerate’s heyday was over.
6 
Shareholder value would be enhanced by spinoffs, break-ups, and divisional buyouts; 
and since that kind of restructuring would enhance shareholder value, that’s what 
would happen. Shareholders would make it happen. America’s financial conglomerates 
would be restructured in the 2010s in the same way that America’s over-grown 
industrial conglomerates were restructured in the 1980s. Other mainstream analytics 
have been similar.
7 
One could extend this corporate analysis. Internal forces can restructure the too-
big conglomerate. Managers at financial divisions will buy out their division, if it can 
be better managed when separated from the firm’s core. Boards reviewing the firm’s 
future strategy could conclude that far-off divisions cannot be managed well and 
should be spun off. Activist shareholders might undertake proxy fights to get new 
directors to bring about operational changes. Such fights to elect new directors often 
fail,
8 but then firms eventually implement policies similar to those sought by the 
shareholder activists. For potential financial losses of the size of JPM’s London Whale 
trading loss, ordinary corporate governance measures could cure the problem. 
Regulation was needed, in this view, only to handle the chance that the loss would 
exceed the value of the bank’s equity. Only that kind of loss would put the public fisc 
at risk. Corporate governance is good enough to contain the losses below the level that 
would invoke the too-big-to-fail de facto guarantees. 
* * * 
Overall, a plausible analytic for JPM and the $6 billion Whale loss — and one 
with which reasonable analysts agree — is thus that (1) the problem is one for 
shareholders and managers, not the public, and (2) the normal forces of corporate 
governance would press to right-size the big financial firms, if they are indeed 
operating at too big a scale. That defense of JPM is powerful and, as we’ve seen, was 
embedded in its CEO’s comment on the loss: “A tempest in a teapot,” he said.  
                                                                                                                                                   
Losses in Perspective, Weiss Ratings May 11, 2012, available at http://www.weissratings.com/news/ 
articles/jp-morgan-chase-putting-losses-in-perspective/. 
6 Henry Kaufman, Big Banks Are Not the Future, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2012. 
7 Lionel Barber, The Fall of the Universal Bank, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 21, 2012 (“The decline of 
the universal bank will pass unlamented. The … financial supermarket has long been eclipsed by the 
destruction of shareholder value after the crash.”). 
8 Lucian Bebchuk, The Myth of the Corporate Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675 (2007); Steven M. 
Davidoff, Andrew C.W. Lund & Robert Schonlau, Do Outside Directors Face Labor Market 
Consequences? A Natural Experiment from the Financial Crisis (SSRN working paper, 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2200552. Degradation Due to Too-Big-to-Fail Finance 
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II.       STRUCTURAL DEGRADATION DUE TO THE IMPACT OF TOO-BIG-TO-
FAIL: CONCEPT 
 
We take this standard corporate incentive-for-efficiency story, deepen it, but 
then see how shareholder, board, and managerial incentives warp under too-big-to-fail 
pressures, degrading corporate governance, perhaps severely. Some financial firms 
may become too-big-to-manage (an idea in the literature) and, with the normal 
corporate governance constraints turned off due to the too-big-to-fail subsidy (an idea 
that, although not in the literature, is our focus here), the firm is rendered even more 
susceptible to specific error, such as the $6 billion London Whale failure of senior 
management to oversee the trading desk properly, and to general error, such as the firm 
swelling beyond its optimal size and scope because the optimal size would lose the 
too-big-to-fail subsidy. These latter possibilities of systematic organizational 
degradation at too-big-to-fail firms are extensive, important, and not yet well-analyzed 
in the policy discussion as foundational corporate governance fissures. 
Thus the thesis here is that the normal shareholder, managerial, and board 
incentives and pressures to right-size and restructure firms degrade and disappear in 
too-big-to-fail financial firms. Too-big-to-fail status lowers the firm’s cost of capital, 
and that funding advantage would be lost to the firm in an operationally-sensible 
restructuring. The threat of losing that value acts like a poison pill in an industrial firm: 
operational value could be created if a shareholder activist succeeded, but due to the 
pill, the activist cannot capture that value for itself. Knowing that it cannot capture the 
value that it will create, the activist desists from activism. Improving the too-big-to-fail 
organization is not, here, in shareholders’ interests. Worse than the pill, the subsidy 
also eviscerates internal incentives of boards, managers, and any controlling 
shareholders to right-size their financial firm to be operationally efficient. The private 
incentives induce the affected firms to be less efficient than they would otherwise be. 
 
A.  Too-Big-to-Fail as Poison Pill 
 
A simple poison pill works as follows: The corporate board issues preferred 
stock to its current shareholders. If a control-altering event (such as a single 
stockholder accumulating stock in excess of 10% of the firm’s common) occurs, then 
the terms of that preferred stock issue allow each old shareholder to redeem his or her 
preferred shares for, say, 10 shares of new common for each share of preferred, but the 
new 10% shareholder-intruder is barred by the terms of the preferred stock from 
participating. The pill dilutes the activist blockholder’s common shares, poisoning its 
incentives to be active: It would have 10% of the common stock and be ready for 
action operationally, but would know and fear that if the pill is redeemed it will suffer 
a massive financial loss, as the pill would dilute the activist down from 10% to only 
1% of the target firm’s common stock. Anticipating that dilution, the activist shies 
away from buying up the target firm’s stock and looks for other investment 
opportunities. In other variations, the poison has the target making a large payment to a Degradation Due to Too-Big-to-Fail Finance 
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supplier, or losing a key supplier, if the control shifts inside the firm.
9  
The too-big-to-fail subsidy works analogously. If the subsidy lowers the 
financial firm’s financing costs, then the activist who is confident that it can fix the 
target firm must also swallow the “poison” of the firm losing that funding subsidy. The 
potential subsidy lost for the largest American financial firms has been quite large, as 
we shall see in Part III. Hence, a restructuring would need to recover this large funding 
loss before change agents could profit from enhancing the financial firm’s corporate 
efficiency. There have been extremely few takeover efforts in the finance sector.
10  
Worse, the too-big-to-fail subsidy degrades internal incentives to restructure as 
well. The day-to-day incentives of a board with subsidized debt differ from the day-to-
day incentives of a board with higher funding costs, as the next Sections illustrate.  
 
B. Too-Big-to-Fail as Breakup Protection 
 
Consider the weakened incentive for internally-generated spinoffs and break-
ups. The financial firm’s board judges, say, that one of its businesses does not fit well 
with the firm’s overall strategic plans and that its continuance in the firm is, its initial 
analysis indicated, holding down its stock price. It plans to sell the business to a 
nonfinancial firm, or sell it to a smaller financial firm, or spin it off. The financial firm 
would then plan to retire the debt that it had originally used to finance the misfit.  
Standard thinking is that managers and boards are often reluctant to let go of 
their operations. They want the bigger empire for the associated prestige, power, and 
oftentimes compensation. For the too-big-to-fail firm, the managers and boards have 
another powerful reason to be reluctant. As long as their lowered funding costs make 
up for the shortfall due to degraded operations, the too-big-to-fail firm’s board and 
managers should find it beneficial, in terms of shareholder profit, to hold on to the 
misfit. The board may explicitly realize that the subsidy and lowered cost of funding 
has this negative operational impact. Or, they just find that, when they seek to sell the 
misfit, the investment bankers come back to the board with low bids from firms that 
are not too-big-to-fail. The bids are low because the potential buyer lacks access to the 
same cheap, subsidized funding that the too-big-to-fail firm enjoys. The board can 
conclude the spinoff is a bad deal for them, without having consciously sought to 
obtain, or retain, or to analyze the too-big-to-fail subsidy. 
 
C. Too-Big-to-Fail as Stymieing the Managerial Divisional Buyout 
 
Managers at an orphaned division commonly buy out their division or 
                                                           
9 R ONALD  J.  GILSON  &  BERNARD  S.  BLACK,  THE  LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE 
ACQUISITIONS 741 (2nd ed. 1995). Even more strongly analogous are structural impediments to takeover, 
such as lucrative contracts for the target firm that expire upon a change-of-control of the firm. The 
structural impediment would visit the costs of the change-of-control on all shareholders, as does the loss of 
the too-big-to-fail funding advantage. The pill visits its costs on the activist, in the first instance. 
10 Hamid Mehran & Lindsay Mollineaux, Corporate Governance of Financial Institutions, 4 ANN. 
REV. FIN. ECON. 215, 223 (2012); Renée Adam & Hamid Mehran, Is Corporate Governance Different for 
Bank Holding Companies?, FRBNY  ECON.  POLICY  REV., Apr. 2003, at 123, 126 (“[D]espite active 
consolidation in the banking industry, there have been very few hostile takeover bids.”).  Degradation Due to Too-Big-to-Fail Finance 
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subsidiary. They borrow considerably, find some equity capital for the buyout, and buy 
up a division or a subsidiary that they are motivated to run well. 
The too-big-to-fail subsidy weakens their incentives, as well as those of the 
firm’s board and shareholders for the buyout. The subsidiary’s managers find their 
funding costs cannot support the buyout. They believe that they will increase the 
division’s profitability by 50% after the spin-off, but their funding costs would be 50% 
higher than the parent company’s. The parent company board will consider the 
managerial buyout, but they find the price too low. This process could occur without 
the parent firm’s managers or board being aware of the subsidy. They match up 
funding costs of the buyout with the value of the division and find that the numbers do 
not match, attributing their cheaper funding to their own superior efficiency. 
* * * 
Related channels of corporate governance degradation are in play, involving 
excess leverage, misshapen executive compensation, and how the too-big-to-fail 
subsidy can incentivize lobbying for poor regulation. We explore this related 
degradation further in Part VI. But first let us examine the data on too-big-to-fail 
financial institutions. 
 
III. THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF BEING TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL:  DATA 
 
The data on the too-big-to-fail subsidy comes largely in two major forms: First, 
rating agencies estimate the difference in quality between the big banks’ stand-alone 
strength and their enhanced strength with the government back-up. The ratings now 
show a big gap between the two, with that gap still wide after the passage of Dodd-
Frank, the law intended to stabilize American financial firms. Second, economists 
measure the subsidy by comparing funding costs of large and small banks, to estimate 
how much less expensive the big banks’ debt financing costs are. Or they compare the 
cost of deposits above the insurance limit, with the cost of insured deposits.  
These numbers seem at some level small (80 basis points per annum, in some of 
the larger estimates, or less than a 1% discount on the amount charged to the banks on 
their borrowings). That leads us to the third, less frequently used measure of the too-
big-to-fail subsidy: what is its size as a fraction of big firm profit? We convert all 
existing estimates into the value to shareholders. Most conversions lead to the size of 
the too-big-to-fail subsidy amounting to a large fraction, at about half of the big banks’ 
shareholder profits. Losing these sums would be serious setbacks. 
 
A. The Data: Concept 
 
A straightforward example illustrates why relatively small funding savings of, 
say, one percent per annum on a financial firm’s borrowings could have a big impact 
on its profits and, hence, shareholder value.  
Financial firms are heavily leveraged. Take one worth $100 with 10% of its 
funding coming from stockholders’ equity and 90% from debt. (Ignore that insured 
deposits make up some of that debt.) Posit that equityholders expect a rate-of-return of 
20%, at the firm’s level of risk. They want a return of $2 each year. Degradation Due to Too-Big-to-Fail Finance 
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The lenders estimate that while the chance of failure is only one in 100 
annually, failure would be a total operational loss were there no bailout. But because 
the lender anticipates that the government will bail it out and pay them the $90 lent if 
the firm fails, the lender lowers the interest rate by 1% because the one in 100 chance 
of failure will not be costly to the lender. (Ignore that small depositors are always paid 
in a bank failure; that short-term lenders and large depositors have usually been paid; 
that others, like long-term bond market lenders, are often paid; and that some classes 
of firms, like large insurers and investment banks are new to the too-big-to-fail arena.) 
So, the lenders’ willingness to lower their charge to the firm reduces the firm’s cost of 
capital by .9% (from 1% of 90), or 90 basis points. That seemingly small amount is 
nearly half (45%) of the $2 of profit that the heavily-leveraged equityholders seek. The 
subsidy is vital to shareholder profit. Losing it would be serious indeed. 
 
B. The Data 
 
The evidence that larger banks have lower funding costs than smaller banks is 
extensive.
11 But that does not in itself tell us the source of their funding advantage — 
efficiency, subsidy, or something else. 
Examine Figure 1, based on Moody’s recent ratings for the big banks. Moody’s 
rates the quality of loans made to the banks. When it does so, Moody’s separately rates 
the banks on their standalone credit quality and on their full credit quality, which 
adjusts the standalone value for the likelihood that the government will support the 
bank if it would fail and otherwise be unable to pay back the lender. 
As the graphic shows, most large financial firms in the United States get a 
substantial credit quality upgrade due to the presence of the de facto government 
guarantee. Citibank, for example, is rated A3 on an overall basis, or investment grade, 
while it is rated Baa3 on a stand-alone basis, which makes it near junk-bond quality, 
meaning there would be a substantial chance that the firm would default on payment 
during the life of the relevant bonds. This gap is common for the larger banks.  
Here is Moody’s verbal descriptive of its results: 
 
The … median senior debt rating for firms with global capital markets operations 
is A2 (at the operating company level). This is three notches higher than the 
Baa2 median standalone credit assessment, and reflects the substantial benefit of 
our assumptions about external support, primarily from governments.  
Given their systemic importance [to their economies] … , these [big financial] 
firms’ debt and deposit ratings continue to rank in the upper range of our global 
universe of rated financial institutions. While we recognize the clear intent of 
governments around the world to reduce support for creditors, the policy 
framework in many countries remains supportive for now, not least because of 
the economic stress currently stemming from the euro area and the potential 
systemic repercussions of large, disorderly bank failures, and the difficulty of 
resolving large, complex and interconnected institutions.  
Our view that these groups retain access to government support in case of need, 
                                                           
11 Ata Can Beray, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Harry Huizinga, Do We Need Big Banks? Evidence on 
Performance, Strategy and Market Discipline, J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION (forthcoming, 2013) (MS at 26). Degradation Due to Too-Big-to-Fail Finance 
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at least for now, is consistent with the substantial capital and liquidity support 
that several of them have received in recent years.  
In five cases (JPMorgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse 
and Morgan Stanley), the long-term debt ratings declined less than their 
standalone credit assessments [i.e., the rating strength due to government backup 
has been increasing, not decreasing].
12   
 
Figure 1. Moody’s bank debt ratings, with and without government backing 
 
Ten recent academic and regulatory studies measure the too-big-to-fail subsidy 
in two ways:  the change in its level from before and after the financial crisis, and  the 
ongoing level of the subsidy. The studies, summarized in Tables 1 and 2, have results 
in the same general range, with a mean increase from pre- to post-crisis amounting to a 
third of 2009 profits (Table 1) and an ongoing support level exceeding one-half of the 
averaged 2006, 2009, and 2012 profits (Table 2), with its size spiking in 2009. Some 
studies convert the rating agencies’ judgments in rating differences into a measure of 
annual subsidy of the firm's debt,
13 others use credit default swaps on bank debt
14 or 
                                                           
12   Moody’s Investors Service, Special Comment, Key Drivers of Rating Actions on Firms with 
Global Markets Operations, at 3, 13 (June 21, 2012). 
13 Zen Li, Shisheng Qu & Jing Zhang, Moody’s Analytics, Quantifying the Value of Implicit 
Guarantees for Large Financial Institutions (Jan. 2011) (Moody’s report). 
14 Id.; Frederic A. Schweikhard & Zoe Tsesmelidakis, The Impact of Government Interventions on 
CDS and Equity Markets (SSRN working paper, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1573377. 
Standalone Credit Assessment, including any shareholder group support                            
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different banks’ cost of funds.
15 Others measure the different rates on deposits above 
and below the formally guaranteed amount
16 or differences in bond pricing
17 or stock 
returns.
18 Although the studies’ time periods, studied firms, and techniques differ, their 
results are remarkably similar, with the size of the increase amounting to a major 
fraction of large financial firm profits.   
Consider one prominent study in more detail, a study associated with the 
International Monetary Fund in 2011 — “Quantifying the Value of the Subsidy for 
Systemically Important Financial Institutions,” by Kenichi Ueda and Beatrice Weder 
di Mauro — which has typical results.
19 Using rating agency results from Fitch, one of 
the major rating agencies, the authors calculate the increase in the support rating before 
and after the financial crisis, and then translate this into a funding cost advantage based 
on the difference in interest charges due to ratings quality across the market. They 
estimate that the funding subsidy increased by 20 basis points (.2% annually) during 
the financial crisis, presumably because lenders raised their estimate of the 
government’s willingness to bail out a wide range of firms. Because financial firms use 
so much debt and so little equity to finance themselves (with debt ten or twenty times 
the size of their equity), saving funding costs of .2% annually on the debt can amount 
to 15 or 20% of the banks’ profits.
20  
Baker and McArthur, authors of another prominent work measuring the size of 
the too-big-to-fail subsidy, also focus on funding cost changes over time. During the 
pre-crisis years, from 2000 through 2007, larger banks with more than $100 billion in 
assets had a funding cost advantage over smaller banks of .29%. This advantage 
widened during the 2007–2009 financial crisis to .78%, an increase of 49 basis points, 
presumably because the big banks were seen as likely to be bailed out, while smaller 
financial firms — MF Global at about $40 billion in assets, for instance — would not 
be.
21 This increase translates to an annual funding cost advantage for the eighteen large 
banks of $34 billion, an amount equivalent to half of their combined 2009 profit. The 
measured post–crisis subsidy increase for the biggest six U.S. banks is commensurate. 
                                                           
15 Dean Baker & Travis McArthur, The Value of the "Too Big to Fail" Big Bank Subsidy (Center 
for Econ. Policy Res. Issue Brief, Sept. 2009), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/ 
publications/too-big-to-fail-2009-09.pdf.  
16 Stefan Jacewitz & Jonathan Pogach, Deposit Rate Advantages at the Largest Banks (SSRN 
working paper, Sept. 19, 2912), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2018474.  
17 A. Joseph Warburton, Deniz Anginer & Viral V. Acharya, The End of Market Discipline? 
Investor Expectations of Implicit State Guarantees (SSRN working paper 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1961656.  
18 Priynak Gandhi & Hanno Lustig, Size Anomalies in U.S. Bank Stock Returns: A Fiscal 
Explanation, J. FIN. (forthcoming, 2013); Elijah Brewer III & Julapa Jagtiani, How Much Did Banks Pay to 
Become Too-Big-To-Fail and to Become Systemically Important, 43 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 1 (2013). 
19 Kenichi Ueda & Beatrice Weder di Mauro, Quantifying the Value of the Subsidy for 
Systemically Important Financial Institutions, (IMF working paper, 2012), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12128.pdf. 
20 A firm worth $100 with a .2% subsidy on $100 of financing gains $.20 annually. (If only some 
financing is subsidized, like just debt, or only long-term debt, then the gain is less.)  If the firm is leveraged, 
with $90 of debt and $10 of equity, then a subsidy on all debt would be $.18. If profits are 10% of its $10 of 
equity, it earns $1 annually, which compares to $.18 of annual subsidy. 
21 Baker & McArthur, supra note 15, at 2. Degradation Due to Too-Big-to-Fail Finance 
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Table 1. Increased too-big-to-fail funding advantage after the financial crisis,  
as portion of profit. 
 
Table 2 summarizes measured baseline level of the too-big-to-fail advantage to 
the big financial firms, reconfigured as a portion of profits, and averaged over their 
2006, 2009, and 2012 profits. Overall, the data points to a substantial baseline 
advantage, amounting to a noticeable fraction of financial firm profits, with the size of 
the advantage increasing noticeably during the financial crisis. 
Big banks surely have size-based efficiencies and big firms’ bonds are more 
liquid than small firms’ bonds.
22 While most work finds evidence that banks exhaust 
economies of scale at a level well below the size of the biggest financial firms,
23 not all 
                                                           
22 Joseph P. Hughes & Loretta J. Mester, Who Said Large Banks Don’t Experience Scale 
Economies? (Fed. Res. Bank Phil. Working paper no. 13-13, 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2256059. 
23 For reviews of the evidence concluding that big finance is inefficient, see Robert DeYoung & 
Chao Jiang, Economies of Scale and the Economic Role of Banks (working paper, 2013), available at 
http://www.vgsf.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/P/DeYoung_and_Jiang_May_22_2013.pdf; Richard Davies & 
Belinda Tracey, Too Big to Be Efficient? The Impact of Implicit Funding Subsidies on Scale Economies in 
Banking (Bank of England working paper, 2012), available at http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/research/ 
institutes-and-research-groups/ebc/events/2012/post-crisis/daviestracey.pdf. Cf. Hulusi Inanoglu et al., 
Analyzing Bank Efficiency: Are “Too-Big-to-Fail” Banks Efficient? (Rice U. working paper, 2012), 
available at http://michaeljacobsjr.com/InanogluJacobsLiuSickles_BankEfficiency_1-7-12.pdf; Asli 
Study Implied equity 
subsidy
Actual data and results
Baseline result Sample Baseline data
Pre‐crisis time 
period
Post‐crisis 
time period
Dean Baker & Travis 
McArthur, The Value of the 
"Too Big to Fail" Big Bank 
Subsidy
9% ‐ 50% 9 ‐ 49 bps 
difference in 
funding costs
Institutions with 
greater than $100 
billion in assets 
in March 2009
Average quarterly 
cost of funds
Q4, 2008 ‐ Q2, 
2009
2001 ‐ 2007
Stefan Jacewitz & 
Jonathan Pogach, Deposit 
Rate Advantages at the 
Largest Banks
31% 30 bps difference Institutions with 
greater than $200 
billion in assets
Deposit interest 
rates offered to 
money market 
deposit accounts
Q4, 2008 ‐ Q3, 
2010
Q1, 2005 ‐ Q3, 
2010
Kenichi Ueda & Beatrice 
Weder di Mauro, 
Quantifying the Value of 
the Subsidy for 
Systemically Important 
Financial Institutions
20% Median 
difference 
between 2009 
and 2007 of 20 
bps
All banks with 
Fitch support 
ratings (including 
international)
Ratings support End of 2009 End of 2007
Frederic A. Schweikhard & 
Zoe Tsesmelidakis, The 
Impact of Government 
Interventions on CDS and 
Equity Markets
61% 60 bps difference, 
pre‐ and post‐
crisis
Financial 
institutions with 
CDS 
Credit default 
swap data
2007 ‐ 2010 Pre‐crisis
Li, Z, Qu, S & Zhang, J, 
Quantifying the value of 
implicit government 
guarantees for large 
financial institutions 
(Moody's report)
34% 33 bp increase in 
spread between 
big and small 
bank credit 
default spreads
Top 20 banks by 
assets in 2007
CDS and Moody's 
Expected Default 
Frequency / fair‐
value CDS 
spreads
Post‐crisis 2001 ‐ 2010
Average range change 33.5%Degradation Due to Too-Big-to-Fail Finance 
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do.
24 It is possible that both are in play, with the big banks having some efficiencies 
from scale economies and substantial too-big-to-fail distortions.  
 
Table 2:  Too-big-to-fail funding advantage levels, averaged over 2006, 2009, and 2012, 
recalibrated as portion of profits 
 
A large fraction of the funding advantage seems likely to come from the too-
big-to-fail subsidy. Table 1’s studies measure the increase in funding advantages for 
big finance after the financial crisis. Since it is highly unlikely that big finance became 
more efficient due to the crisis, the measured increase seems best attributable to the 
market seeing too-big-to-fail support as increasingly likely, and the most recent study 
                                                                                                                                                   
Demirgüç-Kunt & Harry Huizinga, Are Banks Too Big to Fail or Too Big to Save? International Evidence 
from Equity Prices and CDS Spreads, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 875 (2013); John H. Boyd & Amanda Heitz, 
The Social Costs and Benefits of Too-Big-to-Fail Banks: A “Bounding” Exercise (2012), available at 
http://casee.asu.edu/upload/TBTF_AER_Final_New_Title.pdf. 
24 Hughes & Mester, supra note 22; David C. Wheelock & Paul W. Wilson, Do Large Banks Have 
Lower Costs? New Estimates of Returns to Scale for U.S. Banks, 44 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 171 
(2012); JP Morgan Europe Equity Research,  Global Banks — Too Big to Fail? Big Can (Also) Be 
Beautiful (2010), available at http://www.docin.com/p-44748761.html. 
Study
Sample Baseline data Time period
Dean Baker & Travis 
McArthur, The Value of the 
"Too Big to Fail" Big Bank 
Subsidy
75% Institutions with greater 
than $100 billion in 
assets, compared to those 
with less
Average quarterly cost of 
funds, provided by the 
FDIC
Q4, 2008 ‐ Q2, 
2009
Kenichi Ueda & Beatrice 
Weder di Mauro, Quantifying 
the Value of the Subsidy for 
Systemically Important 
Financial Institutions
77% All banks with Fitch 
support ratings (including 
international)
Credit ratings (overall, 
and with a without 
support from government 
or from parent banks)
End of 2009
Viral V. Acharya, Deniz 
Anginer, & A. Joseph 
Warburton, The End of Market 
Discipline? Investor 
Expectations of Implicit State 
Guarantees
27% Top 10% (by size) of SIC 
codes of 60 ‐ 64 with US‐
issued bonds
Bond pricing data  from 
three separate databases
1990‐2010
Priyank Gandhi & Hanno 
Lustig, Size Anomalies in US 
Bank Stock Returns: A Fiscal 
Explanation
37% U.S. incorporated 
commercial banks, non‐
depositorty credit 
institutions, and 
investmentbanks
Differences in risk‐
adjusted returns in bank 
stocks
1970‐2009
Elijah Brewer III & Julapa 
Jagtiani, How Much Did Banks 
Pay to Become Too‐Big‐To‐Fail 
and to Become Systemically 
Important?
36% 8 merger deals that 
brought organizations to 
over $100 billion in assets
Pre‐merger prices and 
purchase prices, and 
asset sizes of target and 
aquiring firms
1991 ‐ 2004
Bryan Kelly & Hanno Lustig, 
Too‐Systemic‐To‐Fail: What 
Option Markets Imply About 
Sector‐wide Government 
Guarantees
91% US financial institutions 
(of all sizes) and the 
financial sector index 
Daily option data (nine 
SPDR sector exchange‐
traded funds and the 
S&P500 ETF)
2003‐2009
Average: 57%
Implied equity 
subsity
Actual data and resultsDegradation Due to Too-Big-to-Fail Finance 
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on the subject, from the Bank of England, so concludes.
25 Several studies have long 
attributed financial firm mergers to the desire to obtain the too-big-to-fail funding 
benefits
26 and, the biggest American financial firms are bigger today than they were 
pre–Dodd-Frank. JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, and Citigroup, are 15% larger 
than they were in 2007.
27  
One recent study from the financial industry deserves further comment. It 
defended the industry, minimized the size of the subsidy, and attracted financial media 
attention. The Goldman Sachs authors concluded that over recent years, the big banks 
had a funding advantage over smaller banks of only 31 basis points (.31%) and that the 
advantage has been narrowing or disappearing recently.
28 But seeing the numbers in 
basis points can be misleading when evaluating incentives: While small as a fraction of 
the debt, a long-run subsidy of .31% annually on a leveraged firm’s debt can readily 
account for 25% or 30% of the firm’s profits. Moreover, given that small banks in the 
United States have been the most failure prone, the Goldman report is correct in 
refocusing subsidy and bailout attention on small banks as well large ones. But by 
doing so, their report facilitates the mistaken inference that the big firms’ 31 basis 
funding advantage is a standalone amount, when it’s an amount on top of any small 
banks’ too-big-to-fail subsidy.  
Finally, note that most studies focus on deposits and long-term debt rates to 
derive a too-big-to-fail subsidy. But for the biggest too-big-to-fail banks, much of their 
funding and operations are in non-deposit, short-term debt — the famous derivatives 
(usually short-term bets on movements of interest rates, currencies, and other financial 
items) and repos (short-term, often overnight repurchase agreements). Derivatives and 
repo contracts are effectively prioritized over bonds if the bank fails.
29 Because small 
banks do not use these types of short-term debt, the big banks’ long-term debt is, all 
else equal, riskier (because it gets paid after the short-term debt) and accordingly costs 
more than the smaller banks’ long-term debt. If it does not cost more than small bank 
long-term debt, that indicates an offsetting benefit, such as a too-big-to-fail subsidy. 
Similarly, counterparties to too-big-to-fail firms should be more willing to do business 
                                                           
25 Davies & Tracey, supra note 23; ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW 
CLOTHES 89 (2013) (“incentives for banks to become large through mergers can be partly attributed to cost 
advantages from implicit subsidies they obtain by becoming too big to fail”). 
26 George Benston et al., Motivations for bank mergers and acquisitions: enhancing the deposit 
insurance put option versus earnings diversification, 27  J.  MONEY,  CREDIT  &  BANKING 777 (1995); 
Edward J. Kane, Incentives for banking megamergers: what motives might regulators infer from event-
study evidence? 32 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 671 (2000). See generally Michael Keeley, Deposit 
Insurance, Risk and Market Power in Banking, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 1183 (199)). 
27 Bank growth is based on asset size, as reported by the banks. Bank of America Annual Reports, 
available at http://investor.bankofamerica.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=71595&p=irol-reportsannual# 
fbid=btuXJHoa2Bx; JPMorgan Chase’s Annual Reports, available at http://investor.shareholder.com/ 
jpmorganchase/annual.cfm; Citigroup’s 2007 Annual Report, available  at http://www.citigroup.com/ 
citi/fin/data/k07c.pdf; Citigroup’s 2011 Annual Report, available  at http://www.citigroup.com/ 
citi/investor/quarterly/2012/ar11c_en.pdf. 
28 Goldman Sachs Global Markets Institute, Measuring the TBTF Effect on Bond Pricing (May 22, 
2013), available at http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/public-policy/regulatory-reform/measuring 
-tbtf.html 
29 Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Players’ Payments Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 
STAN. L. REV. 539 (2011). See also Franklin Edwards & Edward Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy 
Code: Why the Special Treatment?, 21 YALE J. REG. 91 (2005). Degradation Due to Too-Big-to-Fail Finance 
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with them than with firms that need to stand on their own. This preference will 
translate into better contracting terms for the too-big-to-fail firm, or greater business 
volume, or both. This too-big-to-fail benefit may well be large and is not captured in 
traditional measures of the benefit. 
 
C. The Instability of the Too-Big-to-Fail Subsidy 
 
The size of a too-big-to-fail subsidy is not stable but changes. Regulation gets 
better, or worse. Financial transactions change. The economy improves, making failure 
unlikely, or degrades, making failure more likely. Bank defenders could respond that 
the subsidy was once there, but has disappeared, or is disappearing. Or the big increase 
in the too-big-to-fail subsidy detected during and after the financial crisis will subside, 
in this view, as the economy stabilizes, as financiers learn from mistakes, and as 
regulators reconstruct the rules. This possibility of a declining subsidy leads to two 
reactions, one a view of cautious skepticism, which I outline next, and another of the 
transactional consequences, which are quite substantial, if and when the subsidy 
disappears, which I save for the end of this Article, for Part VII. 
First, some skepticism. Big picture pressures can induce the policy consensus to 
too quickly see the too-big-to-fail problem as resolved. The interests of the regulated in 
minimizing a too-big-to-fail problem are obvious and need not be detailed. And 
regulators also have reason to move on. They are acting via new legislation, new 
regulation, or new vigor in applying long-standing principles. For them to indicate that 
the too-big-to-fail problem today is not yet substantially under control would be to 
admit that their actions were insufficient, poorly constructed, or poorly executed. 
Moreover, a regulatory system can only be on high-alert, tensed up, for so long.  
And, most simply, but quite realistically, a strong economy makes financial 
failure less likely than a weak economy. Too-big-to-fail benefits rise and fall with the 
economy, even if policies and firms’ operational risks stay constant, because in a 
healthy economy they will not fail and in a weak economy they are more likely to. 
Policymakers and opinion-makers may readily confuse an improved economy — and it 
usually does improve after a crisis — for a permanent fix to the too-big-to-fail 
problem, rather than a real but temporary respite. The data suggests a big boost in the 
subsidy during the crisis, which might subside,
30 but one should not ignore that the 
data also points to longstanding, substantial, albeit lower, subsidy levels outside of the 
crisis.
31 
Pre–Dodd-Frank regulatory opinion shows how easy it is to consider the 
                                                           
30 Peter Eavis, Moody’s Threatens to Cut Credit Ratings of Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2013, at 
B3 (ratings agencies believe regulators would let long-term debt default under Dodd-Frank’s wind-down 
approach and, with long-term debt bailout of this debt less likely, the rating agencies plan to cut the banks’ 
credit ratings). Whether the rating agencies end up captured by those they rate, which was a problem in the 
run-up to the financial crisis, would need to be considered. Cf. id. (“Paul Volcker, a former chairman of the 
Federal Reserve, expressed skepticism about Dodd-Frank’s wind-down approach. ‘No one in the market 
believes it,’ he said.”). 
31 Consider regulators who says more needs to be done to end the too big to fail problem. Jesse 
Hamilton, Bernanke Says Too-Big-to-Fail Banks May Face New Capital Demands, BLOOMBERG, July 18, 
2013, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-18/bernanke-says-too-big-to-fail-banks-may-
face-new-capital-demands.html. Degradation Due to Too-Big-to-Fail Finance 
 
17
financial mission to have been accomplished. Failures such as that of Continental 
Illinois and Long-Term Capital Management had induced regulators to reassess failure 
possibilities. A former Federal Reserve Board governor opined in a prominent, 
intelligently-done essay that “[t]he evidence does not support a worsening of the too-
big-to-fail problem. To the contrary, the evidence seems to support that [due to 
banking reforms, new legislation, and new regulation,] there has been substantial 
improvement on this score.”
32 New legislation and better regulation, in his view, had 
induced “a sea-change in the industry,” as bank capital was up, banks were managing 
risk better, and the Basel accords were taking effect.
33 Moreover, market yields 
showed no excessively large too-big-to-fail bounce in long-term bank bonds, as there 
once had been
34 and relative yields between large (too-big-to-fail) banks and small 
banks narrowed or disappeared. This view was unexceptional at the time among the 
financial cognoscenti
35 and regulators.
36 Yet it was a view expressed in 2006, one year 
before the financial crisis began and AIG, Bear, and Lehman failed. 
* * * 
Nevertheless, the financial circumstances could change, and could change due 
to Dodd-Frank, which sought to bring more regulatory discipline to American banking. 
The too-big-to-fail feature of American finance is over time a variable, not a constant, 
with its likelihood and its extent rising and falling, expanding and contracting, and 
moving from one geographic region and financial sector to another, and from small 
institutions to large ones, and back again. 
 Thus, if one is skeptical of the post–Dodd-Frank importance of the too-big-to-
fail subsidy, this article serves to analyze what the corporate governance situation in 
the big banks will look like if new subsidy data turns out to be consistent with the data 
we now have, which indicates a major too-big-to-fail uplift. It analyzes the corporate 
governance channels that too-big-to-fail distortions ultimately degrade. It also leads to 
substantial dealmaking predictions, outlined at the end of this Article, if the too-big-to-
fail subsidy increase of the past half-dozen years narrows or disappears. And, for 
optimists, the analysis provides added reason to be thankful that the problem is under 
control. But if one concludes that post–Dodd-Frank risk-setting in big finance is 
insufficiently changed from the pre-crisis setting, or that the too-big-to-fail problems, 
                                                           
32 Frederic S. Mishkin, How Big a Problem Is Too Big to Fail?, 44 J. ECON. LIT. 988, 996 (2006). 
33 Id. at 997 (“By 2004, the largest banks have more than doubled their capital ratios and are now 
well capitalized…. Furthermore, they no longer have less capital than smaller banks…. The higher capital 
ratios … suggest that they are no longer as willing to take on risk. This could reflect the fact that their 
counterparties perceive that the large banks are less likely to be bailed out….”). 
34 Id. at 996-98 (“bond yields … reflect a bank’s [actual] riskiness [and the narrowing rate 
difference] suggests that the too-big-to-fail problem is not as bad as it once was.”). 
35 A well-respected British banking regulator opined that “reducing the possibility of the disruptive 
failure of a [large and complex financial institution] is a central preoccupation of public policy. The good 
news is that the likelihood of such an eventuality is remote.” Andrew Crockett, Dealing with Stress at 
Large and Complex Financial Institutions, SYSTEMIC  FINANCIAL  CRISES:  RESOLVING  LARGE  BANK 
INSOLVENCIES (Douglas D. Evanoff & George G. Kaufman eds., 2005), at 18. 
36 Larry D. Wall, Too-Big-To-Fail after FDICIA, FED. RES. BK. ATLANTA, ECON REV., Feb. 1993, 
at 1, 18. (“FDICIA should … reduce interbank risk substantially. The prompt corrective action provisions 
and the increase in market discipline … constrain bank risk taking….  [T]hese factors should almost 
eliminate the risk that one bank’s failure would cause insolvency at other banks.”) (emphasis supplied). Degradation Due to Too-Big-to-Fail Finance 
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even if temporarily under control, could return, as they have before, then this Article 
serves to analyze the corporate governance consequences, to which we now return. 
 
D. The Required Takeover Premium 
 
Consider now the extreme corporate governance restructuring initiative of a 
takeover. Reducing the chance of a takeover is not the most important degradation due 
to subsidy — hostile takeovers are rare now and the most important incentive 
degradation occurs inside the firm, not outside. But examining the antitakeover 
incentives vividly shows us what the too-big-to-fail subsidy takes off the table as 
transactionally possible.  
Historically the premium needed to make a takeover happen was an offer that 
was 50% above the pre-takeover price of the target firm’s stock.
37 Compare the needed 
premium to the rough estimate that the subsidy amounts to 33% of the core too-big-to-
fail banks’ profits.
38 As such, the firm’s operations would earn, say, $2, but the bank’s 
profits would be $3, due to the subsidy. If the bank lost that subsidy in degraded 
operations, putting the profit-level back to $2, then a takeover activist would find a 
takeover unprofitable, even though it believed it could raise the firm’s profitability 
(and, presumably its stock value) by 50%, back to the pre-takeover $3. 
Examine this problem in more detail. If the financial firm’s profitability were $2 
per annum, and the stock price $20, then the takeover entrepreneur who believed it 
could make the firm worth $30 (because it could raise the firm’s annual operating 
income to $3 or could break it up into parts worth $30 in the aggregate), could offer up 
to a 50% premium over the ongoing price of $20. A deal is doable between the market 
price of $20 per share and the takeover activist’s assessment that the firm can be turned 
into a $30 per share firm. 
But if the financial firm’s stock price is already trading at $30 and earning $3 
per share annually, due to the subsidy, then the takeover entrepreneur comes to 
understand that it could not make the firm worth (say) $40. Yes, it could add $1 per 
share to the overall annual operating earnings by restructuring the firm. But the 
restructuring, if it induced the bank to lose its too-big-to-fail status and, hence, the 
extra $1 per share, would yield a firm still worth $30 per share, not $40 per share. 
The takeover activist, after running these numbers, would withdraw, desisting 
from agitating for a takeover and break-up of the target firm, even if it were confident 
that the target could be put on a sounder operational foundation. This too-big-to-fail 
firm has become takeover-proof. 
Incentives for boards to restructure on behalf of shareholders are similar:  the 
too-big-to-fail subsidy would dilute, reduce, and quite plausibly eliminate their 
incentives to proceed with even operationally very profitable restructurings, if the 
restructuring would put the too big-to-fail subsidy at risk. Even a controlling 
shareholder would desist, unlike an efficiency-minded controller of a large but not too-
big-to-fail industrial firm. Even a board’s simple decision to raise new equity will be 
impeded, because more equity reduces the probability of bailout, which reduces the 
                                                           
37 Gilson & Black, supra note 9, at 600. 
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value of the too-big-to-fail subsidy. 
 
IV. THE EXTENDED SOCIAL COSTS 
 
The too-big-to-fail bailouts at public expense during the 2007–2009 financial 
crisis were a source of public anger, inducing the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress’s major 
reaction to the financial crisis and the bailouts, to have “no more bailouts!” as an 
organizing rationale. But as we argued thus far, the cost of too-big-to-fail finance is not 
just in bailouts, and not just in the more important financial disruption that major 
financial failure brings to the rest of the economy. In addition, the financial firm 
degrades organizationally. The costs are direct — the financial firm contributes less to 
the economy — and indirect, because the structural degradation increases the chance 
that the firm will fail in a crisis. In this Part, we extend the analytics of these social 
costs and see how they resemble those of the monopolist.  
 
A. The Monopolist’s Rectangle 
 
Antitrust analysts have examined the social costs of monopoly and oligopoly. 
The classic costs come first from the monopolist raising its selling price above its own 
full costs. Consumers pay more, the monopolist gets richer. 
As it raises its price, some consumers who would have purchased at a lower 
competitive price decide not to buy at the higher price. Only the high-value users 
continue to buy. The monopolist restricts production, so that it sells only to high-value 
consumers, letting sales to ordinary consumers fall by the wayside. The loss from the 
restricted production is represented by the small triangular shape in the middle of 
Figure 2, often called the “deadweight costs” of monopoly.
39  
                                                           
39 Oligopoly has analogous “deadweight costs”, if a small group of firms coordinates a price above 
their own costs. And, in fact, the too-big-to-fail financial sector more resembles the oligopoly context than 
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Figure 2. The social costs of the monopolist’s 
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That standard view was transformed in the 1970s, in ways relevant to too-big-
to-fail corporate degradation.
40 The monopolist’s profit is represented by the rectangle 
in Figure 2, seen until then as a transfer from consumers to monopolist.  
The value of this gain to the monopolist induces it to defend that gain. The 
monopolist protects its monopoly and that rectangle of profits from attack — from 
upstart competitors, from regulators and other lawmakers, or from technological 
change that could displace the monopolist’s business. Its investments in self-protection 
are social costs, deadweight damage to the economy as egregious as the lost 
production of the monopoly triangle. The monopolist will invest in this socially costly 
monopoly protection in an amount up to the value of that rectangle. 
Worse, the monopolist’s organizational strength weakens. Managers can run 
through some of the value in that rectangle and still give the firm’s owners more than 
the ordinary competitive profits they expect. There is considerable evidence of 
organizational degradation in publicly-owned firms with market power.
41 With the 
monopoly profits coming into the firm, boards and senior managers can dissipate some 
of that value and still provide the firm’s shareholders a good return. 
B. The Subsidy as Analogous to the Monopolist’s Rectangle 
 
The too-big-to-fail problem is analogous. The immediately visible cost of too-
big-to-fail banks is that they will be bailed out in a financial crisis, at government 
expense. This potential is well known. 
The too-big-to-fail phenomenon degrades corporate performance as well. Begin 
with Figure 3, which illustrates banks’ supply and demand curves for funding in a fully 
competitive, nonsubsidized environment. (We introduce the subsidy in Figure 4.) The 
sector seeks funding for their projects. The x-axis represents the quantity of funding 
sought, with the y-axis representing the cost of funding. The first projects are highly 
profitable, so the sector is willing to pay much to finance them. Later projects are less 
profitable, so the sector will not pay as much. The demand curve slopes downward, as 
is typical. The supply curve is flat here, showing a single interest rate being charged to 
the firm. Where the supply and demand curves meet represents the price that clears the 
market, at the intersection of P* and Q*.  Q* could also be taken to represent the size 
of the sector: funding is demanded for what the sector can implement profitably. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
the monopoly one. But the social costs of monopoly are easier to illustrate graphically than the oligopoly 
structure, and nothing is lost conceptually by using monopoly instead of oligopoly. 
40 Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975); 
Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft, 5 WESTERN ECON. J. 224 (1967). 
41 For the bank-based literature here, see Franklin R. Edwards, Managerial Objectives in Regulated 
Industries: Expense-Preference Behavior in Banking, 85 J. POL. ECON. 147 (1977); Timothy H. Hannan & 
Ferdinand Mavinga, Expense Preference and Managerial Control: The Case of the Banking Firm, 11 BELL 
J. ECON. 671 (1980) (finding office expenses and employment levels rise in banks in concentrated markets). Degradation Due to Too-Big-to-Fail Finance 
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Next, introduce the too-big-to-fail subsidy. Because financiers to the too-big-to-
fail sector believe they are likely to be repaid even if the financial firm fails, they 
charge less interest than if the firm’s failure would surely be visited upon the lender. 
Lenders are willing to lend more cheaply to the too-big-to-fail sector. This willingness 
is represented by the supply curve moving downward, as in Figure 4. 
If the too-big-to-fail financial firms and their managements only pocketed the 
subsidy, production would stay at Q*. The cost of the debt would be lower at PS, 
yielding the firms savings in their cost of capital at the difference between the 
competitive cost of funds, P*, and the subsidized cost, PS. If the financial firm did 
nothing further, it would enjoy subsidized extra profits represented by the rectangle in 
Figure 4, amounting in size to (P*- PS) x Q*. Eventually one of the financial firms 
would fail and be bailed out. The predicted cost to the government would be the sum 
of the rectangles through time, paid to the financial firm’s creditors.  
 
 
Price (cost 
of bank 
financing) 
Q* 
P* 
Figure 3. Supply and demand for funding an 
unsubsidized too-big-to-fail sector. 
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Figure 4. The too-big-to-fail sector’s rectangle of 
potential corporate degradation. 
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Figure 5. The too-big-to-fail sector’s economically 
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These then are the well perceived costs of the system having too-big-to-fail 
firms.
42 Consider next the added corporate degradation. 
The organizations degrade, due to the presence of that rectangle. The firms’ 
managers are not as careful, because they have the extra profits from the subsidy to 
cushion them, and the normal corporate controls on major corporate degradation are 
gone:  break-ups and some takeovers, and indeed any improvement that makes the firm 
unsinkable, would cause the firm to lose the subsidy, represented by the rectangle in 
Figure 4. The entire rectangle can potentially be lost to the economy.
43 These are not 
yet well-perceived costs of the system having too-big-to-fail firms. 
The subsidy initially makes shareholders in the too-big-to-fail sector richer. But 
then the too-big-to-fail sector can go down another path. First, big finance has reason 
to expand the scale and scope of its activities. With the new cost of funding to the 
sector at the lower PS, the sector can take on new activities with the new, cheaper 
finance available to it. It can move its funding size and activity scale out to QS. These 
added activities, represented by the shaded area in Figure 5, would be more efficiently 
handled elsewhere in the economy, with the too-big-to-fail sector only able to 
encompass them because they obtain, while others do not, the subsidized, low-cost 
funding. The too-big-to-fail sector becomes bigger and more unwieldy. 
 
C. The Degradation as Another Channel to Financial Crisis 
 
Failures of financial institutions can be costly to the economy, as we learned 
again during the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Financial institutions fail, they shrink, and 
they withdraw from lending, leading to the economy weakening. Unemployment 
increases, financial markets deteriorate, the economy degrades. These are the well-
known costs of financial failure.  
The corporate governance degradation channel here leads to two other channels 
of economic deterioration. The first has the too-big-to-fail subsidy degrading the 
quality of major financial institutions. The consequence is that the economy suffers 
because major financial institutions at the hub of the economy work less well than they 
could work. This has been the primary cost we have examined in this article. 
A second cost emanates from this problem. The degraded financial institution is 
                                                           
42 E.g., Christy Romero, Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program, Special Inspector General’s Quarterly Report to Congress at 6 (Apr. 25, 2012). 
http://www.sigtarp.gov/Quarterly%20Reports/April_25_2012_Report_to_Congress.pdf (“A significant 
legacy of TARP is increased moral hazard and potentially disastrous consequences associated with 
institutions deemed ‘too big to fail.’”); Richard Fisher, Monetary Policy and Too Big To Fail (Feb. 27, 
2013) (comments of President, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas), available at http://www.dallasfed.org/ 
news/speeches/fisher/2013/fs130227.cfm (“[F]irms capture the financial upside of their actions but largely 
avoid payment—bankruptcy and closure—for actions gone wrong…. Such firms enjoy implicit subsidies 
relative to their non-TBTF competitors.”); Sherrod Brown, Senator from Ohio, Ensuring Ohio Taxpayers 
Don’t Pay for Wall Street’s Failure (Mar. 4 2013), available at http://www.brown.senate.gov/ 
newsroom/newsletters/ensuring-ohio-taxpayers-dont-pay-for-wall-streets-failures (“[T]he same Wall Street 
megabanks which received bailouts from taxpayers in 2009 also receive taxpayer-funded advantages today 
simply because of their ‘too big to fail’ status.”). 
43 Competition inside the too-big-to-fail sector needs to be accounted for. We do so in the next 
Part, where we see that the too-big-to-fail subsidy distorts the competitive arena in the sector. Degradation Due to Too-Big-to-Fail Finance 
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weaker, due to corporate governance degradation. That weakness induces further 
financial failure during a crisis, exacerbating and deepening the basic economic costs 
of a financial crisis. Figure 6 illustrates. 
 
Figure 6. The Too-Big-to-Fail Corporate Degradation Channels 
 
The basic too-big-to-fail costs are at the bottom of Figure 6, embedded primarily in arrow (1), 
representing the known standard problems: if a big financial firm collapses, it will be less able to 
lend, could induce financial panic, and, hence, the government will typically bail the firm out. But the 
too-big-to-fail problem also moves through a corporate governance channel. The too-big-to-fail 
subsidy degrades the corporate quality of the subject financial firms, via arrow (2). The degraded 
firms are costly for the economy, because they do not function as well as they could, leaving too 
many big financial firms at the upper right corner of Figure 6, via arrow (3). And then, lastly, arrow 
(4) shows that the degraded financial firms have a greater chance of failing, due to the too-big-to-fail 
corporate degradation, further degrading the financial system and the economy. 
 
V. FURTHER CORPORATE DEGRADATION 
 
Although the less-than-fully-visible ways corporate governance degrades in too-
big-to-fail financial firms have not previously been examined, related degradation 
channels outside the core corporate governance institutions of boards and shareholders 
have been observed. The corporate governance degradation problem I have analyzed 
here widens several of these known channels. First, the subsidy perniciously induces 
affected firms to increase their overhanging risky debt, which distorts corporate 
strategy. Second, the best shareholder-oriented compensation mechanisms — 
mechanisms that make boards and managers loyal to shareholders — can be good for 
General Motors. But for big finance, shareholder-oriented compensation incentivizes 
boards and managers to use more of the too-big-to-fail subsidy and to avoid structures 
that use less, further degrading the firm’s value to the economy. Third, the subsidy 
distorts the competitive arena for the too-big-to-fail sector, such that competition, 
which elsewhere can reverse corporate governance degradation, can further debase 
corporate structure. Fourth, while managerial fear of criminal sanctions and similar 
governmental enforcement can induce managers to do the right thing, the too-big-to-Degradation Due to Too-Big-to-Fail Finance 
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fail firm distorts prosecutors’ and regulators’ actions as well. Finally, there is a class of 
takeover firms that will not be deterred by the fragility of the too-big-to-fail subsidy 
from buying up a large, poorly managed too-big-to-fail firm — namely, other too-big-
to-fail firms. The financial players’ unwillingness to lose the too-big-to-fail subsidy 
impels them to larger, more unwieldy firms, which is worse for the economy.  
 
A. The Subsidy as Debt Overhang  
 
Thus far we have seen how the too-big-to-fail subsidy destroys basic corporate 
governance incentives. It also distorts capital structure decisions. 
It is well known that capital structure choices can influence the firm’s choice of 
investments and can enhance, or can degrade, managerial decision-making.
44 Too 
much debt induces managers, if loyal to their shareholders, to accept excessive risks 
that the creditors pay for if the risks turn out badly, but which the shareholders profit 
from if that excessive risk-taking yields good results.
45 Moreover, a shareholder-
oriented firm with much risky debt may forgo profitable projects, because the benefits 
go disproportionately to the overhanging risky debt. Too little debt, on the other hand, 
and managers could forgo extra effort because there are no creditors to challenge them 
if the managers forgo a few dollars of extra operational income. Hence, in the normal 
science of capital structure, there’s a trade-off to be made. 
The too-big-to-fail subsidy affects the relative cost of debt and equity. Typically 
the government does not bail out stockholders of the too-big-to-fail firm, only 
creditors.
46 Hence, the difference in the cost of equity funding and debt funding is 
larger for the too-big-to-fail firm, pushing its board and shareholders to favor yet more 
debt in the firm, all else equal. The firm will be over-indebted, motivated to forgo solid 
opportunities for riskier ones, as Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig have shown.
47 
Excess leverage degrades the firm. Worse yet, the firm will have more reason to 
fight sound regulation that would lead to more safely capitalized firms. Since the 
subsidized debt is cheaper, but equity financing is not, financial firms’ incentives are to 
challenge or side-step capital requirements that would reduce their too-big-to-fail 
subsidy. To get the too-big-to-fail subsidy, the banks must leverage themselves up. The 
negative risk-taking effects arise even in leveraged firms run by single entrepreneurs. 
In contrast, the effects analyzed in this paper come from degradation of core corporate 
governance institutions — board functionality, board motivation for more size and 
fewer spinoffs, and the reduced capacity of capital costs, shareholder pressure, and 
even takeover threats to induce better internal corporate decision-making. 
Prior work has shown how leveraged firms incentivize stockholders to take 
                                                           
44 Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 
AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 323 (1986). 
45 Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147 (1977). 
46 Bear Stearns was an exception, in that the banking authorities managed to merge Bear into 
JPMorgan, with the Bear stockholders receiving some value. 
47 Admati & Hellwig, supra note 25. Excess leverage of the too-big-to-fail bank is an important 
corporate governance problem induced by the too-big-to-fail subsidy. In this article, I instead examine the 
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higher risk, because the risk is borne disproportionately by the firms’ preexisting 
creditors, while stockholders disproportionately benefit from the upside of risk-taking. 
The concept in this paper is related, but different. Even risk-preferring stockholders 
should want the firm to be well managed. But most standard corporate mechanisms by 
which they would achieve that better managed bank are less sensible for shareholders 
of the too-big-to-fail firm to pursue in their own interest. 
 
B. The Executive Compensation Distortions 
 
Managerial compensation issues for the too-big-to-fail firm are important.
48 
Bank leaders seek to maximize the return on bank equity. Their doing so furthers the 
structures we examine here, and proposals to have the bankers compensated with more 
of their banks’ debt could improve managerial incentives.  
These analytics are important and the reform proposals in general are 
promising. But managerial compensation restructuring could not alone well resolve the 
corporate degradation problems identified here, for several reasons. First, managers 
have agency cost reasons to pursue large firms, irrespective of the extent that their 
financial compensation is tied to equity returns. Once their ordinary size preference 
leads to bigger finance, the too-big-to-fail distortions then kick in. Second, regardless 
of how managers are compensated, the shareholder-oriented analytics of the paper 
would persist, unchanged. As long as boards are responsive to shareholders, the too-
big-to-fail subsidy would induce the distortions and degradations outlined here. 
 
C. Competitive Failure and Market-wide Degradation 
 
Competitive capital markets incentivize industrial firms to be more efficient 
than otherwise. For financial firms, the same process could be at work. Financial firms 
compete for capital and seek the least expensive capital. The resulting equilibrium 
could be presumed to represent the most efficient capital structure for the firm.
49  
But in the presence of a major too-big-to-fail subsidy for debt, competition’s 
impact is ambiguous, and potentially negative, for overall economic efficiency. To 
corral the private benefit of the subsidy, firms that can get the subsidy have reason to 
compete to maximize it.
50 But maximizing this private benefit then insulates the firm 
from useful corporate governance incentives. As long as the private benefit exceeds the 
expected value of the corporate governance incentives, competition’s impact is to 
                                                           
48 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247 (2010); 
Sallie Krawcheck, Four Ways to Fix Banks, 90 HARV. BUS. REV. 107, 109 (2012); Frederick Tung, Pay for 
Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation for Risk Regulation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1205 
(2011); Hamid Mehran, Enhancing Bank Risk-Management: (Inside) Contingent Capital as Employee 
Compensation (Fed. Res. Bank NY Res & Stat. Group working paper, July 12, 2010). 
49 Samuel G. Hanson, Anil K. Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, A Macroprudential Approach to 
Financial Regulation, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2011) (considering the possibility). 
50 Cf. Anat R. Admati, Peter M. DeMarzo, Martin F. Hellwig & Paul Pfleiderer, Fallacies, 
Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity Is Not Expensive, at 
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maximize the private pluses, not the overall pluses for the economy.  
Moreover, competition in the too-big-to-fail sector need not be on matters that 
are in the public interest. Too-big-to-fail institutions may shift their businesses from 
markets in which they compete primarily with one another, such as the market for 
major loans, into markets where major competitors do not get the too-big-to-fail 
subsidy. They prefer, for example, derivatives trading in which their balance sheet 
strength and implicit support makes them more desirable trading partners than smaller 
hedge funds. The latter might fail, the too-big-to-fail firms cannot.  
Or, the competition can be in innovative ways to obtain, expand, and use the 
too-big-to-fail subsidy, rather than to provide better services to the economy. For 
example, credit default swaps were one of the major innovations in big finance in 
recent decades, originally pioneered at JPMorgan. Their original purpose was to reduce 
regulatory requirements on bank loans. When a bank makes a loan that might be 
uncollectable, regulators require the bank to have capital to back up the loan. For some 
bank loans — such as loans to the United States via bank purchase of Treasury 
securities or loans to highly-rated AAA credits — the  regulators do not require the 
bank to keep extra capital.
51 
The credit default swap innovation at JPMorgan was for the bank to agree with 
an AAA investment-grade firm that in the event of a default on the underlying loan, 
the bank and the AAA–rated firm would swap the bank’s loan for the AAA firm’s 
cash. In effect, the AAA firm guaranteed the loan. Regulators treated such loans 
covered by credit default swaps as equivalent to lending to the AAA investment-grade 
firm, so they allowed it all to be funded with too-big-to-fail financing, without any 
need for further bank capital. With the AAA backstop, the loan could not contribute to 
the bank’s failure, it was thought. Many of these credit default swaps were written by 
AIG, the huge, once-investment-grade insurer, whose failure, partly due to its over-
exposure in the credit default swap market, was a key event in the 2007–2009 financial 
crisis. In effect, innovation maneuvered the financial system to obtain more too-big-to-
fail low-cost financing than it would have otherwise. This innovation was a 
competitive advantage to JPMorgan.
52 Competition in the too-big-to-fail sector, hence, 
is not necessarily on matters that benefit the American economy. 
 
D. Too-Big-to-Jail 
 
Managers and boards about to undertake seriously dangerous activity, as 
opposed to just making honest mistakes, rightly fear that government prosecutors may 
                                                           
51 In the terms we are using in this Article, when the bank loan is risky, the bank cannot fund the 
loan entirely from too-big-to-fail financing. Rather, it must fund the loan partly out of its own capital, 
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punish them with regulatory restriction or, at the limit, criminal prosecution.
53 The 
individual manager’s fear of prosecution could keep him or her well away from 
activity that could damage the firm.  
But prosecutors are wary of putting too-big-to-fail firms or their managers on 
trial. “As Attorney General Eric Holder admitted to the Senate … , when banks are 
considered too big to fail it is ‘difficult to prosecute them.... [I]f we do bring a criminal 
charge, it will have a negative impact on the national economy.’”
54 One further 
discipline on managers of the too-big-to-fail firm weakens. 
 
E. Who Can Buy the Too-Big-to-Fail Financial Firm? 
 
The too-big-to-fail de facto poison pill does not deter every corporate 
governance pressure. Shareholders may embarrass or replace the CEO or restructure 
the board, without breaking up the firm.
55 Some shareholders tried this at JPMorgan 
Chase following the London Whale fiasco.
56 Nonetheless, like corporate governance 
free-rider problems generally, activists cannot capture the full measure of 
improvements they induce. And too too-big-to-fail status extends this free-rider 
problem, as activist shareholders would share gains not only with other shareholders 
and financial creditors, but also with the government and the overall economy. 
Moreover, large banks expand and they may expand so much that the 
degradation costs approach the subsidy benefit. That degree of over-expansion or 
organizational lack of integrity can induce restructuring. A too-big-to-fail subsidy 
pushes large financial firms to a new size frontier, which they may pass at their peril.
57 
More on this in Part VII. 
There is another strong corporate activity that the subsidy hardly deters. 
Takeovers, even unfriendly ones, can proceed nicely — but only if the offering firm is 
another too-big-to-fail firm. The offering firm gets the subsidy and the purchase does 
not eviscerate the target’s too-big-to-fail subsidy. Hence, the subsidy does not directly 
deter the takeover by another too-big-to-fail financial firm. 
The result, however, is an even larger too-big-to-fail firm. The too-big-to-fail 
offeror can outbid those not too-big-to-fail, because the big firm would not lose the 
                                                           
53 Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The Consequences to Managers for 
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54 Richard W. Fisher & Harvey Rosenblum, How to Shrink the “Too-Big-to-Fail” Banks, WALL 
ST. J., Mar. 11, 2013, at A17. That is, jailing the senior manager would negatively affect the too-big-to-fail 
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55 Cf. Susanne Craig & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, JPMorgan Campaigns to Keep Dimon in 2 Top 
Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2013. 
56 Susanne Craig & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Small Firm Could Turn the Vote on Dimon, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 7, 2013, at C1. 
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subsidy, as most others would.
58 The recent history of Bank of America taking over 
Merrill Lynch and of JPMorgan taking over Bear Stearns is consistent. 
 
VI.     WHAT CAN BE DONE:  COMMAND-AND-CONTROL VS. INCENTIVE-  
BASED POLICIES? 
 
To say that we have analyzed an underexamined cost of too-big-to-fail finance 
does not mean that we have an obvious, easy-to-implement solution to reverse the cost. 
But the analytic does throw new light on policymaking paths. First, it fits with several 
existing policy initiatives, justifying them further; second, it shows how the financial 
industry’s incentives to resist these initiatives might be changed; third, it points to new 
initiatives to better stabilize finance; and, fourth, it reveals corporate governance 
consequences of successful regulation that diminishes the too-big-to-fail subsidy.  
The broadest and most effective policy would be to deny the large financial 
firms too-big-to-fail status, either by regulators making them indestructible or by 
making their failure tolerable. If no longer too-big-to-fail, and if perceived as such, 
then the too-big-to-fail subsidy would diminish, funding costs for big finance would be 
at stand-alone market rates, and the incentives toward corporate structural degradation 
would decline. Regulators are making such efforts, and these efforts continue. Major 
efforts to increase bank capital have been in play and more have been proposed.
59 
Risky activities are being denied some banks. Mechanisms to resolve banks without 
government support are moving forward. Thus far, the rating agency indications are 
that the efforts have not yet succeeded, as we have seen.
60 But they may in the future. 
Current banking regulation is one of the barriers to bank restructuring, and 
regulators could be more open to a change in control at a financial firm.
61 That is,    
banking rules now require regulatory approval of a change in control of the bank
62 and 
many analysts see these regulations as the barrier to financial changes in control,
63 
because regulators are wary of control changes that could introduce more risk into the 
firm (or because they tend to protect industry incumbents). 
The thinking in this article suggests why shareholders have not been pushing 
regulators to ease the regulatory barrier here, although they have been pushing the 
                                                           
58 The too-big offeror might be deterred if its projected profit negatively correlates with the target’s 
expected profits, which would reduce the total too-big-to-fail subsidy post-merger. 
59 See especially Admati & Hellwig, supra note 25. 
60 See supra Figure 1. 
61 Cf. Peter Wallison & Kenneth Scott, Questions About Brown-Vitter, Shadow Financial 
Regulatory Committee Statement No. 341, May 13, 2013, available at http://www.aei.org/files/ 
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Securities and Exchange Commission for other kinds of shareholder influence.
64 
Profit-oriented shareholders now have little incentive to induce a restructuring that 
improves the too-big-to-fail financial firm but that loses the subsidy. Indeed, although 
shareholder unwillingness to restructure is the problem, inviting them to restructure, 
without any other change, is decidedly not a solution, because their incentives do not 
match the public’s in reducing corporate degradation. Unless the shareholders’ 
incentive structure changes, takeovers alone are no solution. Better policy initiatives 
are needed to align private incentives with public goals. 
 
A. Severe Command-and-Control: Mimicking the Takeover and 
Break-up Market 
 
The corporate governance analytic here resonates with three policy efforts, two 
of which are mainstays of regulatory thinking, and one of which is not. 
One obvious mainstay is for government to break up the big banks — a favorite 
among severe anti-bank critics.
65 Systemic risk reduction and bailout avoidance are 
standard rationales for break-up; severe corporate structural inefficiency is another. 
Government would complete the corporate restructuring in big finance that the poison 
pill quality of the subsidy impedes. 
But a break-up policy has strong countervailing costs. Government is poorly 
suited to formulate and implement a break-up plan well. Years of litigation and 
politicking, due to the banks’ vociferous resistance to a break-up, could cost more than 
the cure. And big finance is heterogeneous: Some firms will be obvious candidates for 
break-up (separating Bank of America from Merrill Lynch, Citigroup overall), in that 
they would never have arrived at, nor could they survive at, their scale and scope 
without the too-big-to-fail subsidy. But once decisions become more nuanced, 
government will be ill suited to reconstruct the financial industry, because some too-
big-to-fail financial firms may be efficiently-sized. We can be confident from the 
corporate degradation analytic that we have a serious problem, and we can be just as 
confident that the government could not precisely sort out the efficient from the 
inefficient. 
A further, subtle counterweight arises. Even if the government could engineer a 
swift, successful, socially-efficient break-up — not a salutary result that we should 
expect — the government will still have egg on its face. The private value of the 
constituent firms when broken apart would be less than their value in the financial 
conglomerate, with the subsidy. The government officials who engineered the break-
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up would be seen to have destroyed private value and would have trouble showing 
why that was socially worthwhile, because the fact that the lost subsidy was not a loss 
to the economy overall would be hard to explain. 
 
B. Mainstream Command–and–Control: More Equity, Restricted 
Activities 
 
One prime policy response to the financial crisis from regulators and analysts 
has been to require increased bank equity.
66 Post-crisis, the Basel III accord pushes for 
banks to have 8 to 10% of their risk-adjusted value in equity. A controversial but vivid 
Senatorial bill, the Brown-Vitter bill, moves the capital target up from the regulatory 
mainstream, by seeking 15% equity.
67 And in a widely-known study, the authors push 
for equity of up to 30% in the bigger financial institutions.
68 American regulators are 
pushing up bank capital and lowering debt.
69 
Increased bank equity would lessen the likelihood of bank failure. If the once-
subsidized bank were made to have enough equity such that it could not fail, then the 
too-big-to-fail subsidy would be eliminated and normal corporate governance 
pressures and incentives would be back in play. 
Similarly, activity restrictions have long been a mainstay of financial regulation. 
Restricting the big banks’ riskiest activities appropriately would lower their probability 
of failure and, hence, that would reduce the too-big-to-fail subsidy. 
The analytic here simultaneously suggests why such efforts are important and 
why they suffer: the incentives inside the firms will be to defeat, elude, and over-ride 
the equity increases, to get too-big-to-fail subsidies back into the firm, and to find 
ways around limits to risky activities if the rules are promulgated despite the 
opposition. The financial firms reacted to the Brown-Vitter 15% capital proposal 
quickly and negatively.
70 And, as soon as regulators announced tougher capital rules in 
July 2013, the media reported that the firms were already finding ways to avoid the 
rule’s impact.
71 If regulators could simultaneously realign financial firms’ incentives 
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— not easy, to be sure — they might do better with the regulation now on the table.  
  
C. Aligning Incentives: Fees to Bring the Cost of Funding to 
Competitive Levels 
 
Government could charge the too-big-to-fail financial firms a fee for being too 
big, tying the size-based fee roughly to the size of the subsidy. Corporate restructuring 
would result, but not via government mandate. Boards and CEOs would on their own 
decide that a restructured, down-sized, and broken up firm would be better for 
shareholders, if the new entities lost the too-big-to-fail fee charges.  
The fee could change corporate governance incentives. Right now, the uplift 
from the subsidy lowers large financial firms’ cost of capital, but if a fee offset the too-
big-to-fail subsidy, then large financial firms would have less reason to stay large just 
to collect that silent subsidy.  
Some firms would pay the fee but stay mis-sized and mis-directed. For others, 
normal corporate governance would function. Firms would have less reason to fight 
regulators raising required equity. (Or, they would have to defeat both to make it 
worthwhile for them to defeat either.) Firms would have less reason to find 
transactional means to defeat the equity requirements, because having less equity and 
more debt would not be as profitable as it had been, due to the fee. 
*  *  * 
Implementing such a fee initiative would face obstacles. First, regulators would 
need to determine its size. This would neither be easy nor would the financial industry 
let it go uncontested, with bankers, their lawyers, and their lobbyists presenting 
evidence that the subsidy is much less than the government says, or that it is in fact 
zero.
72 Even if there once were a subsidy, it is gone, opponents would argue. Indeed, 
media commentary on the subsidy provoked strong industry response, some of it 
specious, some of it appropriately critical.
73 The structure of the fee (more for firms 
with more debt? higher on short-term securities?) would be hard to determine.
74 
Second, a fee would need another level of regulatory policing, which might 
work poorly. And, third, the industry would argue that government creates a large 
fraction of the problem, asserting, say, that government policy in the housing market or 
in bank activity regulation creates systemic risk and, hence, the need to bail out failed 
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large banks.
75 If government were smarter, failures would be fewer, and bailouts would 
never happen. Banks and their shareholders, in this view, should not be made to pay 
for government error. 
The fourth and last major difficulty is subtle but pernicious and, in my view, a 
showstopper. The fee would readily turn into an insurance premium. That is, while big 
finance is usually bailed out, usually is not always. In the last crisis, AIG, Bear 
Stearns, the money market industry, and, indirectly, Citibank and the other big banks 
were bailed out. But Lehman Brothers was famously allowed to fail. And shortly after 
the worst of the crisis was over, MF Global was allowed to fail. Two decades ago, a 
failing Drexel Burnham’s pleas to the Fed to be saved went unheeded. Bailout is 
probable but not guaranteed. If there were a fee, failed financial firms would assert in 
the next crisis that it was their insurance payment, one that would then make it unfair 
not to bail them out. If a fee turned into an assured future bailout, it would steeply 
degrade the financial system further.
76  
 
D. Aligning Incentives: Taxing Financial Firms’ Debt  
 
Switch our frame of reference from fees to taxes. 
Today policymakers seek to increase bank equity and, concomitantly, lower the 
banks’ debt level. Yet, other arms of government push hard in the opposite direction. 
First off, and conventionally, equity is taxed unfavorably, compared to debt: interest on 
the firm’s debt is deductible from the tax bill, but dividend payments and returns on 
equity generally are not.  
Although this is standard knowledge, applicable to both financial and industrial 
firms,
77 the distortive impact is greater for financial firms. Because financial firms are 
more heavily leveraged than industrial firms, their debt-to-equity taxation imbalance is 
more severe. Debt amounts to about 90% of the average financial firm’s capital 
structure, while less than 50% for nonfinancials. And we subsidize debt twice for 
financial firms: they obtain the standard tax deduction for interest, which, given their 
capital structure, is a very high tax distortion. And then we subsidize debt again for the 
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big financials with the too-big-to-fail subsidy.  
Notice the contradiction and the distorted incentives. Regulators properly 
instruct financial firms that they must hold more equity. Then we tax profits on that 
equity, but reduce those taxes if the financial firm pays a return to its funds providers 
in the form of interest, incentivizing the firm to do the opposite of the get-more-equity 
regulatory command. And then via the too-big-to-fail subsidy we further facilitate 
financial firms to use more debt and less equity. These debt-based incentives give 
financial firms strong reason to defeat regulators’ equity requirements in multiple 
forums: in lobbying, first, and then in transactional workarounds if they cannot 
formally defeat the equity-increasing regulation. 
These policies should be rethought. First, current equity-increasing regulation 
may not work well if the twin debt subsidies stay in place. It is a command-and-control 
regulatory effort that runs into a wall of the financial firms’ high incentives to defeat 
the regulation, directly or indirectly. To make it work, more might be needed, such as 
pointing regulatory and tax policy in the same direction. Instead of taxing the corporate 
financial entity based on its profitability, which discourages it from using more equity, 
tax it on its level of debt, which would instead encourage it to decrease its debt level 
and increase its equity level. 
Second, a rebalanced tax policy could do more than buttress other regulation. It 
could become a separate channel to reducing systemic risk of too-big-to-fail finance. If 
tax policy no longer subsidized debt and taxed equity, large financial firms would have 
more reason to adopt systemically sound capital structures and to incentivize 
executives accordingly, and would do so even without being hounded by the regulators 
to increase their capital levels.  
*  *  * 
My purpose here is not to detail a financial firm tax policy with precision, nor is 
it to show how to overcome the policy and political impediments that it would face. 
Rather, I show first how the too-big-to-fail subsidy degrades organizational quality at 
the too-big-to-fail firms and, second, that the degradation analytic points to new policy 
initiatives to offset too-big-to-fail’s negative incentives, namely, a revamped tax 
structure for financial firms. I outline here, without detail, two possible tax 
mechanisms. 
The financial firm’s net operating income would be taxed, presumably at a rate 
closer to 10% than its current 34%.  That is, the corporate tax base for banks would be 
as it is now, but there would be no deduction for interest paid. By eliminating the 
interest deduction while lowering the rate, the tax result would take the same bite out 
of the firm, but would take it out of debt rather than equity.
78 By making it revenue 
neutral, the tax’s resemblance to an insurance fee should dissipate since the policy 
initiative would have a quid and a quo.
79 
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  This tax change would not be problem-free. First, its size would not be 
precisely tied to the size of any too-big-to-fail guarantee or to the size of the damage 
that major bank failures do to the rest of the economy. Second, the size of the tax 
would vary with the level of interest rates, a varying result that may not be good 
policy. Third, as with any tax, the parties will game it — some financial operations 
will move into the financial firm if taxed less there, and vice versa. 
A second incentive-realigning tax structure would be an excise tax on debt. All 
financial firm non-deposit liabilities above, say, $100 billion would be taxed at, say, 50 
basis points, one-half of one percent. The tax would also be revenue-neutral overall 
because the tax authorities would reduce or eliminate the corporate income tax rate for 
financial firms.  
Tax avoidance would arise. Debts would be hidden; characterization of 
transactions as debt would be contested. But by raising the tax on debt levels, financial 
firms would find debt more costly than before. We would then have regulatory 
incentives — command-and-control capital requirements and tax incidence — both 
pointing in the same direction. JPMorgan Chase, for example, most recently paid about 
$6 billion in annual income tax on its approximately $20 billion of profit.
80 That tax 
made equity less attractive to JPM, its shareholders, its board, and its senior 
executives. A reverse tax structure of taxing debt, not equity, would lead to 
shareholders, boards, and senior managers finding themselves with less reason, in their 
own interest, to use so much debt. Incentives would work in tandem with command-
and-control rules.  
*  *  * 
A consistent tax policy should also help sort our efficient big firms from 
inefficient ones. Those financial firms that could not use their subsidized liabilities 
efficiently would have reason to reduce their liabilities. Those that were efficient 
operationally would persist. Looking at the financial landscape today, one would 
expect that JPMorgan Chase and Goldman Sachs would persist, more or less intact. 
Bank of America and Citigroup would not. 
Nevertheless, we should not be under the illusion that a major change in the 
way that financial firms are taxed would be easy to implement. My effort here is not to 
resolve the many technical, conceptual, public choice, and policy problems such a shift 
would entail. Rather, the effort here is to show that the corporate degradation analytic 
points in a policy direction that is not now in view, that the analytic shows why current 
initiatives will have strong transactional and policy pushback, and that the analytic 
points to the peculiarity of government using command-and-control regulation to force 
large financial firms to raise their equity level while simultaneously incentivizing firms 
to suppress equity. The policies should be better aligned. Regulation by instruction 
should be buttressed with regulation of incentives. 
The impact on financial firms and financial markets from such a reconstruction 
would be long-term and substantial, and not a dramatically immediate restructuring, 
nor a difficult-to-engineer, unwieldy, unstable, and perhaps misguided government 
breakup. Rather, the firm, its board, its CEO, and its shareholders would feel steady 
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pressure to right-size the firm. Acquisitions would be more costly. A spinoff to 
divisional managers of a division that once looked deeply integrated with the firm’s 
other product lines would look attractive to a buyer when the firm’s financing no 
longer was artificially cheaper. New ventures would need a higher hurdle rate to be 
justified, more old ventures would become uncompetitive and be shifted and sold. This 
process would be not be a dramatic, once-and-for-all restructuring, but a steady, multi-
year evolutionary reconstruction of the country’s biggest financial firms. But it would 
steadily make the financial system and the economy stronger than it is now. 
 
VII.  THE STRUCTURAL OUTLOOK FOR BIG FINANCE WITHOUT A TOO-
BIG-TO-FAIL SUBSIDY 
 
A.  Reducing the Systemic Cost of Shareholder–Oriented 
Governance 
 
One might mistakenly think that the thesis here grates against the substantial 
and important findings that shareholder-oriented corporate governance was detrimental 
to financial stability during the financial crisis.  But it does not.  
The basis for questioning the value of shareholder-oriented financial firm 
governance is straightforward: As long as there is a strong too-big-to-fail subsidy, 
shareholder interests will find it profitable to take heavy risks, because some 
significant fraction of the risk is borne by the government or by the overall economy, 
not by the firm and its shareholders. Financial firms that were more shareholder-
oriented,
81 firms that had managers compensated more with equity than with debt-like 
obligations,
82 and banks in countries that favored shareholder governance all did worse 
in the financial crisis than their opposites. 
All this is true. But these are reasons why the incentives-based corporate 
governance analytic here is in play. Our problem is to understand how shareholder-
oriented corporate governance today degrades financial firms. It degrades them 
because the too-big-to-fail subsidy distorts corporate governance incentives. If we 
reduced or eliminated that distortion, then shareholder corporate governance could 
work better than it does now. Today we get shareholder-oriented American financial 
firms that have strong private incentives to have thin equity layers that offload risk to 
the authorities and to the financial system, and to build unwieldy, misshapen corporate 
structures. What we should want is to straighten those incentives out by taking away 
the too-big-to-fail subsidy, or if we cannot eliminate the subsidy directly, find a way to 
offset it, so that incentives inside the big firms change for the better. 
                                                           
81 Andrea Beltratti & Rene M. Stulz, The Credit Crisis Around the Globe: Why Did Some Banks 
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working paper, Feb. 2013). 
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B. The Dealmaking Impact of Successful Regulation 
 
We have here considered the corporate governance impact of the too-big-to-fail 
subsidy, in causing misshapen, too-large organizations that lack basic incentives to 
restructure. The subsidy acts like a traditional poison pill, deterring outsiders and 
insiders from improving the organization’s structure. We have also seen that there is 
substantial evidence that the too-big-to-fail subsidy has been large and that it increased 
sharply during the financial crisis. 
Regulators are doing much to raise financial firm capital, restrict their riskiest 
activities, and make resolution thinkable. Some believe they have already succeeded 
and, even if not, they shall in due course. The organizational analytics here point to a 
corporate governance consequence if these efforts succeed, or if the improving 
economy makes financial failure less likely to occur (and, hence, reduces the implicit 
subsidy). If higher capital requirements, improved resolution structures, and activity 
restrictions push down the too-big-to-fail subsidy back to its lower, pre-crisis baseline, 
then corporate restructurings in big finance that were once not viable, should become 
profitable. Pressures to reverse the increase in the biggest financial firms’ size should 
rise. As the subsidy disappears, the misshapen financial firms’ distortions will become 
more obvious and their costs no longer largely or fully offset by the subsidy. As that 
happens, internal incentives of boards and senior managers will change, and activists 
would be able to enter the arena to push to restructure the distorted financial firms. The 
evidence is that the too-big-to-fail subsidy rose sharply in the past half-dozen years, 
accompanied with a major increase in the size of the country’s largest financial 
institutions. If the rise in the subsidy has reversed, or if it reverses soon, then the 
analytics here point, all else equal, to the increase in firm size reversing as well. 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
JPMorgan Chase’s $6 billion trading loss highlighted organizational fragility at 
the country’s too-big-to-fail banks and, as we have seen, starts us on understanding the 
mechanisms of corporate governance degradation in big finance.   
Defenders of the bank, its CEO, and its senior managers saw JPM’s loss as 
massive and regrettable, but well within the bank’s earnings, its huge equity capital, 
and its more-than-trillion-dollar asset base. Hence, the problem, they claimed, is one 
for the bank’s shareholders, its managers, and its board, not one for extended 
regulatory concern. Public funds were never at risk. 
But the proper analysis of JPM’s London Whale trades, as the $6 billion loss 
came to be known, differs. Shareholder-based corporate governance will not work 
when there is a large too-big-to-fail subsidy. Shareholder activists who would takeover 
a less-than-well-run bank to break it up, or divisional heads who would seek to buy out 
an orphaned division, would find themselves handicapped in the break-up or buy-out. 
Not only would they have to make the efficiencies and restructuring work — which is 
hard enough — but they would lose the too-big-to-fail subsidy. The broken up, or 
spun-off, entity would no longer be too-big-to-fail and its cost of funding would rise. 
Activist shareholders would have to overcome a high hurdle, one akin to a corporate Degradation Due to Too-Big-to-Fail Finance 
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transactor’s poison pill.  
Firms grow too large for multiple reasons. Managerial error in projecting 
economies-of-scale that turn out to be evanescent is one of the most benign. Random 
variation is another. Managerial empire-building is common, and a third. The push 
from the too-big-to-fail subsidy is a powerful fourth. Whatever the reason for the 
excessive growth, normal corporate structural pushback is absent or degraded in the 
too-big-to-fail financial firm. Boards that might second-guess expansion have less 
reason to doubt its profitability, when that expansion is financed with the boost from a 
too-big-to-fail subsidy. They need not even be aware of the subsidy; they only need to 
notice its effects — that funding costs are lower — and attribute their good fortune 
solely to their own perspicacity. 
Measures of the too-big-to-fail subsidy are typically cast as discounts on the 
banks’ borrowing rate, with the discount measuring on the high side at 80 basis points, 
or less than 1% per annum. This number may seem small. But, when converted into 
shareholder profits, it amounts to a noticeable portion of bank profit, on average about 
one-third of shareholder profits. This is not a small number. Losing one-third of the 
profit of the financial firm would be a serious setback. Since the sharpest tools for 
corporate governance must cut through this large profit loss before reaching corporate 
operations, the sharpest tools for corporate governance are blunted or broken in the 
large, too-big-to-fail financial firm. 
This destruction of the sharpest tools of corporate governance burdens the 
economy, revealing a second major cost of too-big-to-fail banking. The first set is 
well-known, namely, the government paying to bail out the failed entity and the 
economic setbacks that financial failure deepens. But the second set of costs is also 
serious and pervasive: the degradation of financial firm efficiency even without an 
actual bailout. The core financial firms are run less well due to the subsidy and are 
more likely to fail. 
There are potential cures. The problem emanates from a subsidy that distorts 
organizational incentives, making reversing that subsidy one promising direction for 
regulatory reform. The analytics here can be interpreted as an added rationale for the 
current regulatory efforts to increase bank capital, restrict risky activities, and make 
financial firm failure possible. The analytics also point to how to make the current 
regulatory forays more effective. Instead of relying overwhelmingly on command-and-
control regulation that financial firms have large incentives to resist, reverse, and 
sidestep, policymakers should now also focus on the internal corporate governance 
organizational incentives. They can, and they should, make the financial firm’s debt 
more expensive for its managers, board, and shareholders, while making equity less 
expensive. Command-and-control orders to increase financial capital and reduce risky 
activities are properly the first regulatory responses, but regulatory styles have 
diminishing marginal returns just like other economic activities.  The corporate 
governance analysis here shows how and why another policy channel based on 
organizational incentives could be opened. It is not on the current policy agenda, but 
needs to get there. 
Regardless of whether we can cure the problem, I have here analyzed in depth 
how the too-big-to-fail subsidy degrades the standard, core corporate structural tools Degradation Due to Too-Big-to-Fail Finance 
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— from the sharpest tool of the takeover, to the incentives for spin-offs, to the 
incentives for well-directed shareholder structural initiatives. The corporate 
governance tools that help to right-size, stabilize, and make efficient industrial firms, 
crude and imperfect though they might be, all weaken or disappear in large-scale 
American finance.  
  
 